State v. Hummel: Unanimity is not required as to theories (or methods or modes) of a crime.

“Under the text and original meaning of the Unanimous Verdict Clause, unanimity is required only as to the jury's verdict—its determination of guilt, or in other words its determination that the prosecution has proven each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that the jury was unanimous at that level in this case. And we affirm on that basis." State v. Hummel, 2017 UT 19.

In this case, the defendant challenged his conviction under the Unanimous Verdict Clause of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const. art. I, § 10. He did so on the basis of an alleged lack of unanimity as to alternative factual theories advanced by the prosecution in support of some of the theft counts against him. The court of appeals held that “[t]he Unanimous Verdict Clause requires unanimity as to each count of each distinct crime charged by the prosecution and submitted to the jury for decision. So a generic “guilty” verdict that does not differentiate among various charges would fall short.” Equally important, the court also held that sufficient evidence is not required on every method or means of fulfilling each individual element of each crime in question; rather, such requirement is imposed only for all elements of a criminal charge.

State v. Wadsworth: Complete Restitution if the Offense in Question Results in Bodily Injury

Lost income is available as a component of complete restitution only “if the offense” in question “resulted in bodily injury to a victim.” State v. Wadsworth, 2017 UT 20, ¶ 4.

In this case the Court interpreted the terms of a provision of the Crime Victims Restitution Act, Utah Code section 77-38a-302(5)(b). That provision sets standards for the calculation of “complete restitution.” for victims. It states that “[i]n determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including” six enumerated categories of economic loss. Utah Code § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(i)–(vi). At issue here was one of the six enumerated categories—subsection 302(5)(b)(iv). That subsection states “the court shall consider ... the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim.” Id. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(iv). The State did not allege that the victim suffered bodily injury as a result of the defendant’s crimes, only that his crimes led to the victim's depression, which required counseling and impacted her ability to work. The Court held that the “if clause expresses a condition.” Thus, lost income is only available to a victim if the offense resulted in bodily injury.

State v. Rushton: Single Criminal Objective and Mandatory Joinder

A conditional plea to the latest charges and defendant's prior guilty plea to different crimes did not concern conduct with a single criminal objective so as to require a single prosecution under the mandatory joinder statute. State v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21. 

The petitioner-defendant argued that the State violated the mandatory joinder statute by prosecuting him from 2011 to 2012 for wage crimes after earlier prosecuting and convicting him in 2009 and 2010 of tax crimes. Under the mandatory joinder statute, the State cannot prosecute a defendant in separate actions for conduct that “is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.” The defendant argued that his crimes were a “single criminal episode because it was “closely related in time and ... incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of [the] single criminal objective” of misappropriation of money in his business setting.” However, the Court ruled that this reading of a single criminal episode was too broad and instead considered the totality of the circumstances to determine whether conduct aims at a single criminal objective. The Court listed factors that focused “in particular on the location where the crimes were committed, the nature of the offenses (both the similarity in conduct and, as suggested by the concurrence, the extent to which one offense advances the accomplishment of another), whether the crimes involved different victims, and whether the defendant had the opportunity to deliberately engage in the next-in-time offense.” After weighing these factors, the court concluded that the petitioner-defendant’s criminal conduct did not have a single criminal objective.

State v. Mohamud: Lost Evidence Violating Due Process

Defendant claiming the loss or destruction of evidence violates due process must make a threshold showing that there was reasonable probability that evidence would have been exculpatory. State v. Mohamud, 2017 UT 23.

The defendant, who was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, was found in possession of a shank. One correctional officer testified that he saw the shank being removed by another officer, while a different correctional officer saw the searching officer reach down by the defendant’s ankle where the shank was found. Video footage, if it existed and captured the search, was subsequently taped over inadvertently by the prison. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that there was surveillance footage that captured the incident, that it had been lost or destroyed by the State, that there was a reasonable probability the evidence would have been exculpatory because it could have impeached the State's witnesses' credibility, and that he was prejudiced by the loss of the evidence. The Court held that under the Tiedemann due process analysis, a defendant must make a threshold showing that there is a reasonable probability the lost or destroyed evidence would have been exculpatory.The Court continued “[o]nce the reasonable probability threshold has been satisfied, the second part of the Tiedemann analysis sets forth two factors that courts must balance both to determine the seriousness of the due process violation and to fashion the appropriate remedy: (1) the culpability of the State in the loss or destruction of the evidence and (2) the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the missing evidence.” Here, the defendant failed to meet the reasonable probability threshold because he proffered only speculation as to what the footage might have shown.

State v. DeJesus: Tiedemann does encompass a threshold reasonable probability requirement

“The due process clause of the Utah Constitution requires a defendant to first establish as a threshold matter a reasonable probability that the lost or destroyed evidence would have been exculpatory. By so doing, the defendant establishes that his or her due process rights have been violated. Once a defendant has made this threshold showing, the court must consider the two factors set forth in Tiedemann—the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant—in order to both evaluate the seriousness of the violation and determine the necessary remedy.” State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 19.

In this case, DeJesus kicked a correctional officer during a fight with another inmate. Surveillance footage showed the kicks. The prison failed to make a copy of the recording and after 30 days it was irretrievably lost. DeJesus moved to dismiss the charge under State v. Tiedemann, claiming that the loss or destruction of the surveillance footage constituted a due process violation. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that DeJesus met her threshold burden. The Court then considered the second part of the test and found that the State should have done more to preserve the evidence and failure to do so prejudiced DeJesus. The appropriate remedy in this case was dismissal.