State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22 - Misleading Jury Instructions Overturns Conviction

The defendant’s conviction was overturned based on the ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel did not object to a misleading jury instruction.

State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22

An appeal from a conviction of first-degree rape. Barela claims that his counsel was ineffective in a variety of ways and that the district court erred in refusing to subpoena for the victim's medical records. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the victim had not consented to sex.

The Court reversed based on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the defense attorney did not object to a jury instruction that misstated the mens rea requirement as applied to first-degree rape. 

The trial court gave the following jury instruction: “1. The defendant, Robert K. Barela, 2. Intentionally or knowingly; 3. Had sexual intercourse with K.M.; 4. That said act of intercourse was without the consent of K.M.”

The Court ruled that the instruction was in error because it implied that the mens rea aspect applied only to the act of sexual intercourse, and not to the victim's nonconsent. 

http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Barela150130.pdf

State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10 - URE 404 and Gang-Related Character Evidence.

Mr. Gonzalez appealed his murder conviction mostly with the argument that evidence of his gang affiliation was cumulative and unfairly prejudicial.


State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10

Mr. Gonzalez appealed his murder by arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for directed verdict on the murder and obstruction-of-justice charges, (2) permitting the State to present allegedly cumulative and unfairly prejudicial gang-related evidence, and (3) dismissing as untimely his constitutional challenge to the gang-enhancement statute.

Mr. Gonzalez tried to bifurcate the trial, so his gang involvement would not be admitted until he was convicted. Gang involvement enhances the charges, and would increase the sentence. 

First, the Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Gonzalez was not acting in self-defense. When looking at the issue of aggression, evidence of a “defendant’s verbal and physical acts at the scene of the homicide [is] sufficient” to show that the defendant was the aggressor. State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1981). As an aggressor, he was not able to claim self-defense. The court determined the expert testimony and the evidence of Mr. Gonzalez’s actions indicate that he was the aggressor.

Second, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the gang-related evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides an exception to the general rule of admissibility by permitting courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.” State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This evidence is also allowed because “where gang-related evidence is prejudicial, it is not necessarily unfairly prejudicial and therefore should be admitted where it has high probative value. See United States v. Santiago, 643 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2011). There may be an issue under Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(1), (b)(1), for using gang-related evidence as character evidence, which is prohibited.

            But mere evidence of gang affiliation that does not relate to prior bad acts does not violate rule 404’s prohibition against character evidence. See United States v. Hodges, 315 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, gang-related character or bad-acts evidence will not violate rule 404 if it is admitted for a reason other than to show conformity with that character trait on a particular occasion.

            The court concluded saying that “the gang-related evidence was highly relevant to the State’s theories of motive and intent and to Mr. Gonzalez’s claim of self-defense. The evidence of Mr. Gonzalez’s gang-related tattoos and clothing was relevant to establishing his loyalty to his gang and his willingness to publicly display his gang membership. And evidence of his gang loyalty suggested that, as a committed member of Dog Town, Mr. Gonzalez was highly motivated to retaliate against an insult to his gang.

http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Gonzalez150127.pdf

State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5 - Prosecutorial Misconduct

Ashcraft appealed his 'possession with intent to distribute' conviction by alleging prosecutorial misconduct.

State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5

            The defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a dangerous weapon by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The Utah Supreme Court rejected his arguments giving “substantial deference to the jury.” They “review the evidence and ill inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46.

            Possession charges need only a showing of a “sufficient nexus between the accused and the [contraband] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the inherent to exercise dominion and control over the [contraband].” State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). The court looked at the cumulative evidence, in the light of the specific situation, to confirm that the jury verdict was reasonable, not to determine if there is another possible explanation for the events.

            “To sustain a reversal on an assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must establish both that the prosecutor’s conduct ‘call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and, under the circumstances of the particular case, the error is substantial and prejudicial.’” State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987).

            The court did not find prosecutorial misconduct here because “[t]he prosecutor did not ask the jurors to defer to the state’s judgment over their own. He simply summarized his position and the evidence supporting it and then asked the jury to enter a conviction. Such a statement is as commonplace as it is innocuous in closing argument—a matter well within the realm of appropriate prosecutorial conduct.”

http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/ashcraft150123.pdf

Some recent US Supreme Court Cases

Holt v. Hobbs: The Court determined that preventing a prisoner from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with religious beliefs is illegal. Chisteson v. Roper: The Court determined that a lawyer's interest in avoiding damage to their own reputation is a conflict of interests if at odds with the client's strongest argument.

Holt v. Hobbs

(9-0 Opinion by Justice Alito)

     The Arkansas Department of Correction’s grooming policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 when it prevents a prisoner from growing a half inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.

      The government argued that beards compromise prison safety because they can be used to hide contraband and can be shaved to quickly change appearance. The lower courts unanimously held that the policy met the RLUIPA because it was “the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interest.

      Lower courts erred by holding that because there were “other ways” in which to practice his religion, the petitioner was not allowed to grow his beard. The District Court further erred in determining that the religious burden on the petitioner was slight because “his religion would ‘credit’ him for attempting to follow his religious beliefs.”

      Therefore, the government failed to meet its burden here, because allowing a ½ inch beard, as requested by petitioner, would not compromise the governmental interest.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-6827_5h26.pdf

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Christeson v. Roper

            Christenson’s original habeas attorneys filed an untimely federal habeas petition. The lower courts erroneously denied a petition for substitute counsel. In determining whether a district court abused its discretion in denying such a motion, the court of appeals should consider “the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint.” Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S., at ___(slip op., at 1).

     The District Court’s primary error was not recognizing the original habeas attorney’s conflict of interest, in requiring them to denigrate their own performance. A “significant conflict of interest” arises when an attorney’s “interest in avoiding damage to [his] own reputation” is at odds with his client’s “strongest argument—i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S.

     Holding: A motion for substitution in a federal habeas petition should be granted when it is in the “interests of justice.”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-6873_21p3.pdf

Indigent Defense Act Cases, 2015.

Various cases arose under the Indigent Defense Act. The various cases discussed the differences in procedure depending on the the date in which indigent claims were made relative to the effective date of changes to the statute.

Indigent Defense Act Cases, 2015

The Utah legislature amended the Indigent Defense Act in 2012 in response to State v. Parduhn, decided by the Utah Supreme Court the year prior. The aim was bundling all defense services together and making them available solely through LDA.  The legislature intended LDA to be the exclusive source for all indigent defense services—including counsel and resources. These five cases arrived at the Supreme Court through interlocutory appeals and involve defendants which made claims under the pre-2012 version of the Indigent Defense Act.

            In State v. Perez and State v.Folsom, the Court found for the defendant because they had filed their motions for counsel under the IDA before the IDA amendments were scheduled to start, and the law does not govern retroactively. In State v. Earl, State v.Steinly, and State v.Rodriguez-Ramirez, also about the IDA, the county prevails because the defendant’s motions were filed after the effective date and the amendment was constitutional. There is consistent language throughout the cases.

“A defendant who opts out of public representation has also opted out of public defense resources, and nothing in the Constitution requires a different result.” State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12.

The defendant’s argument “fails as a matter of law because the IDA is not regulating the events giving rise to the criminal charges at issue.” The defendant’s right to indigent assistance vested after the IDA amendment went into effect, therefore the defendant is subject to the new version of the law. Also, the right to counsel, as guaranteed by the 6^th Amendment, does not guarantee a “right to government funded counsel.” State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 2015 UT 16

Even if the Public Defender‘s Association could not qualify as a “defense services provider” under Utah Code section 77-32-201(4), the county had satisfied the statute in an alternative manner, by establishing a “county legal defender‘s office” under Utah Code section 77-32-302(2)(a). See State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 2015 UT 16.