Some recent US Supreme Court Cases

Holt v. Hobbs: The Court determined that preventing a prisoner from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with religious beliefs is illegal. Chisteson v. Roper: The Court determined that a lawyer's interest in avoiding damage to their own reputation is a conflict of interests if at odds with the client's strongest argument.

Holt v. Hobbs

(9-0 Opinion by Justice Alito)

     The Arkansas Department of Correction’s grooming policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 when it prevents a prisoner from growing a half inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.

      The government argued that beards compromise prison safety because they can be used to hide contraband and can be shaved to quickly change appearance. The lower courts unanimously held that the policy met the RLUIPA because it was “the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interest.

      Lower courts erred by holding that because there were “other ways” in which to practice his religion, the petitioner was not allowed to grow his beard. The District Court further erred in determining that the religious burden on the petitioner was slight because “his religion would ‘credit’ him for attempting to follow his religious beliefs.”

      Therefore, the government failed to meet its burden here, because allowing a ½ inch beard, as requested by petitioner, would not compromise the governmental interest.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-6827_5h26.pdf

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Christeson v. Roper

            Christenson’s original habeas attorneys filed an untimely federal habeas petition. The lower courts erroneously denied a petition for substitute counsel. In determining whether a district court abused its discretion in denying such a motion, the court of appeals should consider “the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint.” Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S., at ___(slip op., at 1).

     The District Court’s primary error was not recognizing the original habeas attorney’s conflict of interest, in requiring them to denigrate their own performance. A “significant conflict of interest” arises when an attorney’s “interest in avoiding damage to [his] own reputation” is at odds with his client’s “strongest argument—i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S.

     Holding: A motion for substitution in a federal habeas petition should be granted when it is in the “interests of justice.”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-6873_21p3.pdf

Indigent Defense Act Cases, 2015.

Various cases arose under the Indigent Defense Act. The various cases discussed the differences in procedure depending on the the date in which indigent claims were made relative to the effective date of changes to the statute.

Indigent Defense Act Cases, 2015

The Utah legislature amended the Indigent Defense Act in 2012 in response to State v. Parduhn, decided by the Utah Supreme Court the year prior. The aim was bundling all defense services together and making them available solely through LDA.  The legislature intended LDA to be the exclusive source for all indigent defense services—including counsel and resources. These five cases arrived at the Supreme Court through interlocutory appeals and involve defendants which made claims under the pre-2012 version of the Indigent Defense Act.

            In State v. Perez and State v.Folsom, the Court found for the defendant because they had filed their motions for counsel under the IDA before the IDA amendments were scheduled to start, and the law does not govern retroactively. In State v. Earl, State v.Steinly, and State v.Rodriguez-Ramirez, also about the IDA, the county prevails because the defendant’s motions were filed after the effective date and the amendment was constitutional. There is consistent language throughout the cases.

“A defendant who opts out of public representation has also opted out of public defense resources, and nothing in the Constitution requires a different result.” State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12.

The defendant’s argument “fails as a matter of law because the IDA is not regulating the events giving rise to the criminal charges at issue.” The defendant’s right to indigent assistance vested after the IDA amendment went into effect, therefore the defendant is subject to the new version of the law. Also, the right to counsel, as guaranteed by the 6^th Amendment, does not guarantee a “right to government funded counsel.” State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 2015 UT 16

Even if the Public Defender‘s Association could not qualify as a “defense services provider” under Utah Code section 77-32-201(4), the county had satisfied the statute in an alternative manner, by establishing a “county legal defender‘s office” under Utah Code section 77-32-302(2)(a). See State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 2015 UT 16.

Good Faith Exception Saves Misleading Affidavit

In spite of the fact that the affidavit was misleading, the appellate court held that the evidence seized during the search was admissible under the good faith reliance exception.

Note: Sample from August 2013 Legal Briefs Section

Defendant was convicted for production of marijuana, possession of Marijuana with intent to distribute, unlawful possession of a handgun, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the affidavit supporting the search was deficient. Defendant argued the confidential source used to support the affidavit was unreliable and the affidavit itself contained misleading statements.
The court of appeals relied on U.S v. Leon, which held that the exclusionary rule does not bar evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith reliance on a defective warrant. The court also held that suppression is an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was misled by information that the affiant knew was false.

Here, defendant claimed the affidavit was misleading because it led the judge to believe the affiant witnessed people pull up to a house and buy drugs, when really they just pulled up and had a conversation. Also, defendant claimed it was misleading when it stated, “the suspects living at this address never place their garbage out for normal pickup.” Defendant argues this was misleading because it led the judge to think they never had placed their garbage out to conceal their evidence of drugs, but what it really meant was they had never placed their garbage out during the investigation.

The appellate court held the affidavit was misleading, but affirmed the conviction and held the evidence seized during the search was admissible under the good faith reliance exception set forth in U.S. v. Leon. State v. Nielsen, 2013 UT App 178

On the Lighter Side

DMV Sued After Refusing to Grant Driver’s License to Boy Wearing Make-Up

Chase Culpepper, a sixteen-year old resident of South Carolina, applied for a drivers license at his local DMV office. However, young Chase decided to spice things up and wear make-up for his license photo. Culpepper chooses not to subscribe to societal norms relative to clothing and make-up. So, naturally, Chase wears gender-neutral make-up (Perhaps his love of Capt. Jack Sparrow precipitated this choice).

Chase was denied a license because DMV policy states a driver’s license applicant cannot wear a “disguise” in a driver’s license photo. Chase has now sued the DMV, alleging the policy violates
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Because the DMV allows women to wear make-up in photos but not men, it is likely that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Of greater concern is the mental gymnastic required in determining how much make-up constitutes a disguise.
http://www.cbsnews.com

Court Denies Writ of Coram Nobis

In 2002, Ramiro Oseguera-Garcia (Oseguera) was charged and convicted of third-degree felony theft after he stole a purse from a convenience store customer. Oseguera was working as a clerk at the convenience store when the crime occurred. Oseguera had immigrated to the United States from Mexico in 1972. Before this particular crime, Oseguera had been convicted of retail theft and was on probation. He pleaded guilty to theft on advice of counsel and was sentenced to sixty days in jail and another term of probation. Eight years later, federal immigration officers initiated deportation proceedings against Oseguera based on his third-degree felony theft charge. Oseguera then filed a petition to vacate his conviction under the PostConviction Relief Act (PRCA). His petition was based on the claim that his counsel was ineffective because he was never advised of the possibility of deportation as a result of pleading guilty. Oseguera also sought a writ of coram nobis in the alternative. The district court denied his petition, holding it was untimely. Oseguera appealed, alleging his attorney made affirmative misstatements regarding the possibility of deportation, which was different than what he argued before the district court.
At the district court, Oseguera argued he was never even told about the possibility of the deportation as a consequence to a guilty plea. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his PRCA petition. The court held Oseguera failed to preserve his claim that his attorney made misrepresentations related to the possibility of deportation. In order to preserve this claim on appeal,
Oseguera was required to raise this argument and present relevant legal authority in support of that claim. He failed to do so. Although exceptions exist to this general rule, the appellant must raise an appropriate justification for the court to hear an unpreserved objection. Oseguera failed to do this as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Oseguera’s PRCA petition. In regards to the writ of coram nobis, the court also affirmed the district court’s denial of that writ. The
court explained writs of coram nobis are extraordinary writs and should not be used in an ordinary
case. Citing State v. Rees, the court held a writ of coram nobis is inappropriate for ineffective assistance of counsel claims because the PRCA “establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense… and replaces all prior remedies for
review, including extraordinary or common law writs.” Consequently, Oseguera’s writ for coram nobis was properly denied.
Oseguera v. State, 2014 UT 31.