Thursday, March 9, 2017

During Sentencing, Judges Need Not Reply to Every Argument by Defendant

Not unreasonable in sentencing proceedings for a judge to not address every argument the defendant proffers as long as the judge follows the sentencing guidelines

United States v. Wireman, 2017 BL 60890, 10th Cir., No. 15-3291, 2/28/17.

The Tenth Circuit held that judges do not need to address every argument that a defendant proffers during the sentencing stages of the criminal proceedings as long as a judge follows the sentencing guidelines. In the case, the sentencing judge “alluded to the memorandum” offered by the defendant, but did not speak at length about it. While the defendant offered mitigating factors during the process, it was not procedurally unreasonable for the district court to ignore some of his arguments. After reviewing the district court’s reasoning for the defendant’s sentence, the Tenth Circuit found that the court acted reasonably and had no need to address the arguments of the defendant. The circuit court, however, did encourage judges to go beyond the bare minimum during sentencing and to address and refute any and all arguments a defendant might pose.

Judge Under Investigation Should Have Recused Himself From Trial

A trial judge that was under a bribery investigation by the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting a defendant in his court should have recused himself from the trial

Rippo v. Baker, U.S., No. 16-6316, 3/6/17.

The United States Supreme Court held that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a judge recuse himself while under criminal investigation by the same prosecuting office as a defendant in his court. Before trial, the defendant moved to have the judge recuse himself because of the possibility the judge would not be impartial in adjudicating the criminal proceedings. The motion was denied and the defendant sentenced to death. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, finding that the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “has no actual bias.” In their opinion, the court found that “Recusal is required when….the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”

Lesser DUI Charge Blocked by Double Jeopardy in DUI-Based Vehicular Homicide

When the elements of a lesser charge are incorporated in another and greater crime, double jeopardy bars prosecutors from charging the defendants with the lesser crime

Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 BL 59224, Colo., No. 13SC725, 2/27/17.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that double jeopardy bars charges of lesser crimes that incorporate the same elements of similar, yet greater, crime. In the case, the defendant was charged with a DUI as well as vehicular homicide-DUI, which incorporates the same elements of the DUI charge. The court used the test developed in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989), which defines a “lesser included offense.” In the test, if all of the elements of a lesser offense are also included in the greater offense, then the lesser offense is barred.

Inconsistencies between Pretrial Statements and In-Court Testimony Does Not Render Testimony False

The statements made by three witnesses pretrial that were inconsistent with their in-court testimony does not render that testimony inherently false

 State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13.

The Utah Supreme Court found that inconsistent statements made before trial that conflict with later in-court testimony does not make the testimony inherently false. The testimony at issue was provided by three different witnesses to a murder. Although each witness provided false information or denied knowledge of the incident to the police in the initial police reports regarding the murder, their accurate testimony was still submitted to the jury by the district court judge. The defendant argued on appeal claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the testimony was “inherently improbable.” The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that despite the inconsistencies in statement and testimony, the jury is able to weigh and assess the credibility of the evidence. 

The court reaffirmed the principles developed in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993), holding that the “jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence.” The definition of inherently improbable testimony was also expanded under State v. Robbins to “include circumstances where a witness’s testimony is incredibly dubious and, as such, apparently false.” The Court in that decision held that “where (1) there are material inconsistencies in the testimony and (2) there is no other circumstantial or direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt” may the district court “reevaluate the jury’s credibility determinations.” In such instances, a district court can find the testimony false. The three witnesses and their testimony, while inconsistent, had other circumstantial and direct evidence to bolster their veracity and it was not an error of the court to submit their testimony to the jury.

Wednesday, March 8, 2017

Juror’s Racial Bias Enough to Impeach Verdict and Set New Trial

Revelations of a juror’s racial bias during deliberation opens up the jury verdict to impeachment and allows a court to considers the statement’s in whether to grant a new trial.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).

The Supreme Court held that statements made by a juror during a trial that espouses animus or a bias based on race may violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. In the case, the defendant was convicted of several sex crimes involving minors. After the trial, the defense counsel spoke to jurors about the case and during the conversation, two jurors came forward to alert the defense counsel that one juror made racially disparaging remarks about the defendant to garner support for the conviction verdict. After this discovery, the counsel for the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court, however, denied the motion under the Colorado rule modeled after FRE 606(b), which prohibits the impeachment of a jury verdict based on statements made by a juror.

The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Colorado courts, noting the historical racial bias “implicates unique historical constitutional, and institutional concerns.” Moreover, the court stated “Racial bias is distinct in a pragmatic sense,” while there are safeguards such voir dire or juror observation during the trial, these mechanisms “may be compromised, or….prove insufficient.”

When there is a case where a juror makes a “clear statement that indicates…racial stereotypes or animus [used] to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule gives way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” To show that a racially biased statement impeded a fair trial, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made overtly biased statements that raise doubt on the fairness of the jury deliberations and verdict. The statement must also “show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”

Thursday, March 2, 2017

No Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel before Indictment

A defendant has no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment before formal charges are levied against him or her, even when plea bargaining and other procedural actions are happening

Turner v. United States, 2017 BL 45346, 6th Cir., No. 15-6060, 2/15/17.

The Sixth Circuit ruled that a federal defendant does not have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment until charges are officially levied against the defendant. The issue arose because a defendant was being charged by both the state and federal governments for crimes from the same incident. The defendant retained defense counsel for his state criminal proceedings, but was unable to have counsel appointed for the federal proceedings until he was  officially indicted. During the state proceedings and before a federal indictment, the state-appointed defense attorney gave the defendant advice that later proved detrimental to the defendant’s federal case. In the federal appeal based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant argued that the state appointed counsel provided bad legal advice regarding a plea bargain before the defendant was indicted. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the appeal, finding that the right to counsel did not attach at the time of the bad advice, precluding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought in the appeal. Even though the federal prosecutors communicated with the defendant before his indictment, the defendant did not have a right to counsel.

Secured Police Vans Do Not Create Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Similar to regular police cars, police vans do not create a reasonable expectation of privacy, even when certain security features isolate the arrested individual from law enforcement

United States v. Paxton, 2017 BL 48962, 7th Cir., 14- 2913, 2/17/17.

The Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court’s suppression ruling, finding that defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the back of a police van. Without the expectation of privacy, video and audio recordings are not considered an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. During the criminal proceedings, the court suppressed evidence captured from a video and audio recording of five arrested individuals held in a police van. The court suppressed the video and audio evidence, reasoning that the double plexiglass windows separating the driver and the arrested suspects, thick steel panels on the van, and other security features created a reasonable expectation of privacy for the defendants.

In reversing the decision, the circuit court extended the established principle that there is no expectation of privacy in a police cruiser to police vans, even when there is an appearance of privacy. Additionally, the court pointed to recent incidents where serious injuries and deaths have occurred in police vans as external reasons for the need to maintain camera and audio recording equipment in the van.

Thursday, February 23, 2017

Simultaneous Review of Photos of Suspect not Suggestive

Viewing suspect photos simultaneously, rather than in succession, is not unduly suggestive and does not violate the due process rights of the defendant

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2017 BL 42301, Mass., No. SJC-12055, 2/13/17.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has backed away from an earlier ruling that suggested that photo line-ups for suspect identification should be shown in succession, rather finding that simultaneously showing a collection of photos is not unduly suggestive. In the recent decision, the court pointed towards new studies that indicate that sequentially showing photographs to witnesses for suspect identification were not only more likely to incorrectly choose the suspect, but that they were more likely to choose a completely innocent person. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress the photo identification evidence.

Officer Frisk Allowed, Even with Concealed Carry Law

A person that is lawfully stopped by an officer may be subject to a frisk, even if the state grants concealed-carry permits to its citizens

United States v. Robinson, 2017 BL 18217, 4th Cir. en banc, No. 14-4902, 1/23/17.

The Fourth Circuit held that officers may frisk lawfully stopped citizens in states that grant concealed-carry permits, following the jurisprudence developed under Terry v. Ohio, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, and their progeny. The purpose of a frisk is to prevent the violent use of a weapon, so an officer frisk is warranted even if the person’s possession of a gun is allowed under the state’s concealed-carry laws. Even if there is a concealed-carry law in place, it does not necessarily prevent the danger that an encounter with a law enforcement officer imposes.

Wednesday, February 15, 2017

Justice Court’s Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Prevents Double Jeopardy Problem

After an initial conviction was vacated due to a justice court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the second conviction at the district court level does not implicate double jeopardy protections 

The Utah Court of Appeals held there is no double jeopardy if a crime is improperly tried in a city’s justice court and is later vacated by the district court and properly retried later. In the case, the defendant gave a guilty plea in justice court for violating a protective order, a class A misdemeanor, and began serving a ten-day sentence. After the guilty plea, the defendant immediately appealed his conviction in district court, arguing that the justice court had no jurisdiction to consider a criminal charge above a class B misdemeanor. The district court then vacated the judgment and the defendant was released.

The city properly refiled charges in district court soon after and the defendant moved to dismiss the charges because of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected the argument, finding that the justice court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the double jeopardy, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that the justice court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction prevented jeopardy from attaching from the initial conviction.

Multiple Violations of the Same Protective Order Grounds for Imprisonment

After having a prison sentence twice suspended in favor of probation for violating a protective order, a third violation of the same order and its resulting prison sentence is not unfair

State v. Moosman, 2017 UT App 11.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s sentence of imprisonment for a defendant’s repeated violation of a protective order. The defendant has had a protective order issued against him from contacting the mother of his child, but after two violations of that order which limited contact with the mother, he was placed on probation when his initial prison sentences were suspended. After the third violation of that order, the court revoked his probation and sentenced him to prison for his violations and after a recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole that he serve time in prison for his repeated offenses. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s appeal, finding that there was nothing inherently unfair in the prison sentence and that the trial court was well within its discretion in issuing the sentence. All things considered, including multiple violations of the order and the recommendation by Adult Probation and Parole, the term of imprisonment was fair and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

One Hand on ATV Handlebars Constitutes “Actual Physical Control”

Helping a child steer an ATV while under the influence of alcohol is still considered "actual physical control" because a "person need not operate...a vehicle before he or she may be found to be" in control

State v. Cook, 2017 UT App 8.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that one hand on an ATV handlebar constitutes actual physical control in regards to driving while under the influence, even if it only consisted of “helping” a ten-year-old child steer the vehicle. The defendant was spotted when an officer saw her and two other passengers speeding along a snow covered road riding an ATV. The officer noticed that the adult defendant on the vehicle had a can of beer in one hand and another hand on the handlebars. The defendant argued that she only had a hand on the handlebars to protect the child who was driving the vehicle, thereby not having actual physical control of the ATV. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, citing law that says “actual physical control” means “existing or present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation.” State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1971). The court further noted that the distinction between “operating a vehicle and having actual physical control…a person need not operate…a vehicle before he or she may be found to be in actual physical control.” State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the defendant’s testimony of her actions in regards to the vehicle, found that she indeed exerted actual physical control over the ATV while intoxicated and affirmed the lower court’s conviction.

Officer Testimony about Defendant’s Refusal to Speak not a Reversible Error

An arresting officer's mention at trial of a defendant's refusal to answer questions during the investigation is not inherently a reversible error

State v. Neilson, 2017 UT App 7.

The Utah Court of Appeals found that a trial court did not commit error requiring a mistrial after an officer gave testimony about the defendant’s unwillingness to speak during an investigation. After being arrested and charged with several sex crimes against a minor, the defendant was contacted by his arresting officer as part of the investigation. The defendant exercised his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to speak to the officer further about his charges. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the officer of the contact he had with the defendant. In this line of questioning, the officer testified that the defendant refused to speak with him. After receiving that answer, the prosecutor moved on in his questioning without mentioning the defendant’s silence. The prosecutor did not emphasize this incident and the trial court provided a curative instruction to prevent the jury from drawing a “negative inference” from the “isolated statement.” The Court of Appeals further noted that the defendant failed to establish that the incident “so likely influenced the jury that [he] cannot be said to have had a fair trial.” The trial court’s ruling was affirmed.

Jury Instruction Describing “Serious Bodily Injury” Violated Defendant’s Constitutional Rights

Jury instructions that stated that defined strangulation unto consciousness as a "serious bodily injury" violated the defendant's constitutional rights because he was entitled to the jury making a determination of every element of the crime.

State v. Walker, 2017 UT App 2.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that a jury instruction incorporating language that defined strangulation unto consciousness as a “serious bodily injury” violated the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, requiring the verdict to be vacated and the case to be remanded for a new trial. The defendant was initially charged with aggravated assault for strangling his wife during a domestic dispute. During the trial, the jury was instructed of the varying levels of assault. Additionally, the court included an instruction that was not based on any statutory language, but two Utah Supreme Court cases, that stated “strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury.” The defendant objected to the instruction because it violated his “right to have the jury make a determination of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the offense.” The Court of Appeals rejected the state’s argument that the instruction incorporated a standard by the Supreme Court, finding that the definition of strangulation as a serious bodily injury was never meant to fit into the legislature’s definition of “serious bodily injury.” By including this instruction, the trial court supplanted the jury’s role as fact-finder and establishing the elements of the charged crime. The combination of the instruction, the evidence admitted during trial, and the closing argument by the prosecutor further highlighted the possible influence the instruction had on the jury in reaching their conclusion.

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

Questions that Reiterate Defendant’s Testimony not an Attack of Character

A prosecutor’s line of questioning during cross-examination did not call into question the defendant’s character, thereby preventing the defendant from offering two character witnesses

State v. Issacson, 2017 UT App 1. 

The Utah Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of the defendant’s character witness because the prosecution did not call into question the character or truthfulness of the defendant during cross-examination. The defendant was convicted of carrying a loaded and concealed weapon after being spotted at a city library with a handgun in his jacket pocket. During the bench trial, the defendant stated that he did not think he needed a concealed-carry permit because of the Second Amendment Right to bear arms. Additionally, the defendant sought to produce two character witnesses to testify on his truthfulness and his ability and knowledge of the concealed carry laws. The trial court reserved a ruling on the witnesses after the prosecution objected to the use of the testimony of the witnesses, who were neither at the scene of the crime nor would have relevant testimony to the elements of the crime.  The court later granted the objection after the prosecution cross-examined the defendant and prevented the witnesses from testifying.

Under Evidence Rule 608, evidence of the defendant’s character’s reputation or truthfulness may be admitted, but only after the character was attacked. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding that the prosecution’s line of questioning, including specific questions regarding the finances of the defendant did not “suggest that [the] defendant was lying about his finances or….that he was being untruthful about anything.” Rather, the questions “merely reiterated” the responses that the defendant gave in his testimony to the defense counsel’s questions. Since the defendant’s reputation was not attacked, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant’s character witnesses

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Prosecutorial Misconduct for Civil Asset Forfeiture

A prosecutor’s actions and dubious conduct in handling a civil asset forfeiture led to Rule 11 sanctions against the state and likely bar sanctions against the attorney

In re $26,305 in U.S. Currency, 2016 BL 426593, Ariz. Ct. App., Div. 2, No. 2 CA-CV 2015-0171, 12/20/16.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a Rule 11 sanction against the state and referred a prosecutor to the state bar for abusing the state’s civil asset forfeiture action. After a truck and nearly $26,000 were seized by police, the state proceeded with a civil forfeiture action as to the vehicle and cash. The driver of the vehicle filed a claim for the money and the owner of the vehicle filed a claim for the truck. Later, the state represented that they have filed proper notice about the forfeiture and had not received any claims for the seized property, which was ultimately untrue. The appellate court found that the prosecutor “failed to conduct any reasonable inquiry into whether the application for uncontested forfeiture was grounded in fact or law.” Additionally, the prosecutor ignored court orders to address the claims filed for the truck and money, which almost led to contempt orders.

Jury Allowed to Determine Whether Deleted Email Existed

A district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding the existence of an email that was missing because it would be possible for a jury to determine whether it existed

United States v. Wilde, 2017 BL 3483, 9th Cir. App., No. 15-10302, 1/9/17.

The Ninth Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence regarding the existence of an email that implicated the state of mind of the defendant in a murder case. The circuit court found that the trial court “exercised its gate-keeping function under Rule 104(b) and determined a reasonable jury could conclude that the disputed email existed.” Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court did not commit plain error by not instructing the jury that it should determine whether the email existed before weighing the contents of the missing email. The court stated, “[B]ecause the testimony made clear that there was no record that the contested email was sent or received and its existence was hotly contested, no rational juror would rely on its alleged contents if he or she did not first conclude that it had in fact existed; any instruction to that effect thus could not have made a difference.”

Killing Dogs During a Police Search Not Inherently Unconstitutional

The death of two dogs during a police search was deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because of their aggressive behavior that was impeding a police search of a home

Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep't, 2016 BL 420467, 6th Cir., No. 16-1575, 12/19/16.

The Sixth Circuit held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in killing two pit bulls during a drug raid. Although the court recognized that dogs are property and any unreasonable seizure of them would be considered unconstitutional, due to their aggressive nature and interference in the performance of a large-scale drug raid by police officers, their killing was reasonable. It was irrelevant to the court that the dogs were owned by occupants of the house who were not subject to the search.

Friday, February 3, 2017

Prosecutor’s Remarks on Defendant’s Silence Requires Reversal

Although the prosecutor never remarked that a defendant’s silence implied anything during trial, any reference to a defendant’s silence is enough to require reversal

State v. A. M., 2016 BL 429804, Conn., No. SC 19497, 12/23/16.

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that any comments made by the state during a trial that reference a defendant’s silence during the trial proceedings is sufficient to trigger a reversal. During the closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned twice that the defendant had a constitutional right to remain silent, but that the jury could judge his credibility through statements made before the trial. The court reasoned that any comment on the defendant’s silence, even referencing the right to remain silent, can improperly draw the jury’s attention to the defendant’s decision to not take the stand. Moreover, there was a state statute that expressly prohibited prosecutors from commenting on a defendant’s refusal to testify at trial.

The state defended the error by arguing that it was harmless. The court rejected the argument because the case hinged on the defendant’s credibility, which was implicitly called into question by the reference to his silence at trial.

Buying Drugs with a Gun Does Not Require Heightened Sentences

A gun used to purchase drugs does not qualify a defendant for longer sentences under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

 United States v. Gates, 2017 BL 879, 7th Cir., No. 16-2193, 1/4/17.

The Seventh Circuit ruled that sentence enhancement for the commission of a drug crime cannot stem from the presence of a weapon used only for the exchange of drugs. The court recognized that the enhancement is generally applied only when the weapon is used in the commission of the drug crime. In this case, the gun was used as payment for drugs and as satisfaction for a prior debt. The court, noting how little a role the weapon played in the actual exchange, even outlined how the gun was stored and transported before the drug deal.

Fifth Amendment Still Applies in Pretrial Proceedings

The right against self-incrimination extends to pretrial proceedings because the Fifth Amendment right is more than just a “trial right”

Vogt v. City of Hays, Kansas, 2017 BL 1063, 10th Cir. App., No. 15-3266, 1/4/17.

The Tenth Circuit held that the right against self-incrimination is not limited to trial, but also pretrial proceedings. The court found that the term “criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment includes probable cause hearings, concluding that the right is more than just a “trial right.”

In the case, a police officer was criminally investigated after admitting in an interview with another agency that he has withheld evidence in a trial. The charges were eventually dropped, but the officer sued the city and the police department claiming that the evidence used against him were coerced statements. In the lawsuit, the court sided with the city, holding that the Fifth Amendment only covers incriminating statements if they are used in trial. The Tenth Circuit, however, relying on dicta from Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, was willing to extend Fifth Amendment protections to the pretrial process. The court took into consideration pieces of constitutional history regarding the Fifth Amendment and held that it had a broad application in criminal cases.

Negative Profile Evidence Inadmissible

The use of character evidence, even negative character evidence, gives rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, requiring reversal

Commonwealth v. Horne, Mass., No. SJC-12068, 1/10/17.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that negative character evidence used to profile a defendant is not admissible because it creates a substantial risk of prejudicing the defendant. In Massachusetts, profile evidence has long been established to be inadmissible, but this holding establishes that negative profiling evidence serves the same purpose. Negative profile evidence is generally used to contrast a defendant's profile with the character of a person committing a certain kind of crime.

During the trial, prosecutors used an expert witness that testified on the appearance of a crack addict, claiming that the defendant was “too robust” to fit the profile. Prosecutors argued that the defendant did not fit the profile of a cocaine addict, even though he was found with large amounts of cocaine on him, suggesting that he was too fat to be using drugs and was intending to sell them.

The court, in reviewing this case, found that the prosecutors attempted to persuade the jury by using the profile evidence due to the defendant’s appearance that was specifically designed to contrast him to a stereotype.

Closing Trial to Public for Officer Safety Permissible

A defendant is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief after a state court denies him a public trial, reaffirming that a court has the discretion to close a trial to protect a witness

Moss v. Colvin, 2d Cir., No. 15-2272, 1/9/17.

The Second Circuit held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in closing a trial to the public to protect an officer-witness because it properly considered alternatives, which precluded federal habeas corpus review. The defendant argued that the trial court failed to find an overriding interest that would be prejudiced if the trial was to remain open. Ultimately, the court considered alternatives but met the standard of review that gives courts greater deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in closing trials to the public.

In reviewing the habeas corpus petition, the Second Circuit found that the state appellate court in their review of the trial court’s actions was correct in finding from the record that alternatives were considered and that there was an overriding interest of officer safety that warranted the closure of the trial to the public. The circuit court, however, did caution the trial court to be careful and exact in outlining the reasons a courtroom must be closed to the public.