StingRay Evidence Collected Without a Warrant Violates Fourth Amendment

Evidence gathered by a cell-site simulator that allows police to identify the location of cell phones is suppressed because it violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches

United States v. Lambis, 2016 BL 222804, S.D.N.Y., No. 15cr734, 7/12/16.

  

   A federal district court suppressed evidence gathered after police used a cell-site simulator, sometimes referred to as “StingRay.” The device creates a simulated cell signal that connects with nearby cell phones, much like a cell tower. Through the device, law enforcement can collect the name and numbers of cell phones connected to the device as well as know what text messages or incoming and outgoing calls are being made. In this case, however, the StingRay was used to track the exact location of a cell phone of someone during an investigation. By calculating the strength of the single, DEA agents were able to find the location of the cell phone and its owner.
 

   In making this ruling, the court held that the use of the StingRay equipment used to find the defendant in his apartment was an unreasonable search because the cell phone location would not have been available otherwise. The court compared this case to the thermal-imaging device used in Kylio v. United States, where the Supreme Court found the equipment violated the Fourth Amendment. There, “the Court reasoned that distinguishing between ‘off-the-wall' observations and ‘through-the-wall surveillance' would ‘leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.” Like the thermal-imaging device, the StingRay is not in use by the general public, leading the court to rule that “[a]bsent a search warrant, the Government may not turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device.”

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Lambis_No_15cr734_2016_BL_222804_SDNY_July_12_201?1469216106

Vague Law Prevents Removal of Albanian Immigrant that Committed Robbery

A provision under the Immigration and Nationality Act is void because of vagueness, preventing removal of an immigrant that committed a non-armed robbery

Shuti v. Lynch, 2016 BL 217913, 6th Cir., No. 15-3835, 7/7/16.

   The Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in voiding a provision from the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being too vague using precedent from Johnson v. United States. Under Johnson, the Supreme Court held that “violent felony” was unconstitutionally vague in the Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA). In making this decision, the court ruled that the precedent set in Johnson could be “mixed and matched” with other statutes, making it applicable to other acts with similar language. The court held that the definition of “crime of violence” shares a resemblance to the ACCA’s “violent felony” definition, which was eventually invalidated. The order was vacated ad the case was remanded.

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Shuti_v_Lynch_No_153835_2016_BL_217913_6th_Cir_July_07_2016_Court?1469141588

Prison Sentences for Egg Company Executives is Constitutional

Prison sentences handed to two egg company executives due to negligently allowing their farms to poison thousands of customers is not unconstitutional

United States v. DeCoster, 2016 BL 216013, 8th Cir., No. 15-1890, 7/6/16.

   After poisoning thousands of consumers, the Eighth Circuit ruled that prison sentences handed to two egg company executives did not violate their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The prosecutors, under a provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), sought criminal penalties against the executives of two large egg companies for being negligent in creating “the conditions which gave rise to the charges against them.”

   The defendants argued that they were improperly sentenced because they did not have knowledge that their eggs contained salmonella. The court, however, responded by stating the statute does require the defendants “to have known that they violated the FDCA to be subject to the statutory penalties.” The court also rejected arguments that the sentences were disproportionate to the crime. The court held, “When defining the statutory penalties in the FDCA, Congress recognized the importance of placing the burden on corporate officers to protect consumers ‘who are wholly helpless' from purchasing adulterated food products which could make them ill.”

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_DeCoster_No_151890_No_151891_2016_BL_216013_8th_C.

Class Action by Prisoners Continues, Even as Representative Prisoner is Relocated

A class action suit brought by prisoners can still stand, even if the representative prisoner is relocated because of the susceptibility of mootness for an individual claim in this case

Richarson v. Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2106 BL 227670, 3d Cir., No. 15-2876, 7/15/16.

   The Third Circuit held that a class action suit by prisoners is still certified, even if the representative prisoner is relocated from the prison during the action. The court stated, “When individual claims for relief are acutely susceptible to mootness, a would-be class representative may, in some circumstances, continue to see class certification after losing his personal stake in the case.”

   In making this decision, the court relied on precedent from Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 P.3d 337  (3d Cir. 2004), which provides that a claim for relief which is “susceptible to mootness” by the defending party can still stand if the representative class member has their own claim mooted.  The court found that this precedent withstood the test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, which held that “a “class representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair opportunity to show that certification is warranted.” In the case, however, the relevant corollary was that when a class action representative is denied a fair opportunity “[he] should be permitted to continue seeking class certification for some period of time after [his] claim has become moot.”   



http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Richardson_v_Fed_Bureau_of_Prisons_No_152876_2016_BL_227670_3d_Ci.

After Acquittal of Sexual Contact Crime, Court Cannot Require Sex Offender Therapy

A defendant acquitted of a sexual contact crime and convicted of a lesser battery charge cannot be required to participate in Sex Offender Therapy

Villanueva v. State, 2016 BL 217937, Fla., No. SC13-1828, 7/7/16.

   After having a sexual charge acquitted during trial, a defendant convicted on a lesser battery charge cannot be required to participate in sex offender therapy, says the Florida Supreme Court. Under Florida statute, therapy is allowed as a condition of probation only under a specific list of crimes. This list, however, did not include battery, which the court ruled prevented the trial court from imposing this condition during the defendant’s supervised release.

   The Florida Supreme Court did note that there is an exception that gives trial courts the discretion to impose sex offender therapy, even when there was no sexual crime, but only to prevent future criminal acts, which the court did not foresee as a possibility in this case. In justifying this decision, the court stated, “There is no record evidence that [the defendant] had any prior convictions. Thus, there is no indication that he has a propensity to commit any particular crime, including child molestation or sexual battery. As such, requiring [him] to attend [therapy] cannot reasonably be considered a major deterrent to any future criminality.”

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Villanueva_v_State_No_SC131828_2016_BL_217937_Fla_July_07_2016_Co.