Inconsistencies between Pretrial Statements and In-Court Testimony Does Not Render Testimony False

The statements made by three witnesses pretrial that were inconsistent with their in-court testimony does not render that testimony inherently false

 State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13.

The Utah Supreme Court found that inconsistent statements made before trial that conflict with later in-court testimony does not make the testimony inherently false. The testimony at issue was provided by three different witnesses to a murder. Although each witness provided false information or denied knowledge of the incident to the police in the initial police reports regarding the murder, their accurate testimony was still submitted to the jury by the district court judge. The defendant argued on appeal claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the testimony was “inherently improbable.” The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that despite the inconsistencies in statement and testimony, the jury is able to weigh and assess the credibility of the evidence. 

The court reaffirmed the principles developed in State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993), holding that the “jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence.” The definition of inherently improbable testimony was also expanded under State v. Robbins to “include circumstances where a witness’s testimony is incredibly dubious and, as such, apparently false.” The Court in that decision held that “where (1) there are material inconsistencies in the testimony and (2) there is no other circumstantial or direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt” may the district court “reevaluate the jury’s credibility determinations.” In such instances, a district court can find the testimony false. The three witnesses and their testimony, while inconsistent, had other circumstantial and direct evidence to bolster their veracity and it was not an error of the court to submit their testimony to the jury.

https://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/State%20v.%20Prater20170307.pdf

Intent a Necessary Element for Violating Rules of Conduct in Making a False Statement

The Utah Supreme Court found that sanctions placed on an attorney for making false statements lacked the necessary intent requirement for imposing the specific sanctions

In re Tyler James Larsen, 2016 UT 26.

   After reviewing the sanctions placed on a Utah prosecutor, the Utah Supreme Court found that he lacked the requisite intent to have violated the rules of professional conduct in making false statements. Under Rule 3.3(a)(1), a lawyer shall not “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." During the trial, the prosecutor made false statements about evidence presented to the court, but without proof of intent, he could not be in violation of the Rule 3.3.  The court found that the rule “plain meaning requires that any misstatement to be made knowingly.”

   The Supreme Court upheld the second half of his sanctions, finding that he violated Rule 3.8, which “requires a prosecutor in a criminal case to ‘make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.’” The prosecutor admitted evidence at the time of the trial, which the court concluded there was “no way to characterize the admission he made at trial as a timely disclosure under rule 3.8(d).” In defending his action, the prosecutor attempted to support his lack of timeliness under Brady because he was required to disclose any evidence, even if it was late. The court rejected this argument, noting that the Rules of Professional Conduct not only provide for a fair trial, but also establish an ethical duty that will avoid the problem in the first place.

    The six-month suspension of the prosecutor was also upheld. The court found the mitigating and aggravating factors cancelled each other out, noting that although he was less-experienced, had no prior record of sanctions, and lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, he still refused to acknowledge wrongfulness of his conduct and harm to the victim. Additionally, deference was given to the district court in issuing the suspension because of the support of the record and precedent of similar suspensions for comparable actions.

   Finally, the Office of Professional Conduct wanted to adopt a single system of sanctions where “the ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instances of misconduct among a number of violations.“ The Supreme Court refused to adopt this standard of just one sanction for multiple violations, recognizing the difficulty that exists when a single sanction encompasses multiple violations is reviewed by appellate courts, complicating the punishment after review.


https://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/In%20re_%20Tyler%20James%20Larsen20160616.pdf