Online Research by a Juror Leads to Mistrial

There was a “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial after a court learned of a juror that researched issues related to the trial on their own.

Slavick v. Sequeira, 2016 BL 314700, D. Haw., No. 15-00424 DKW-KJM, 9/23/16.

A U.S. District Court in Hawaii found that a mistrial due to a juror’s independent research of an issue related to the trial created a “manifest necessity” that would not implicate an issue of double jeopardy. The issue arose because the defendant argued that a new trial after the initial mistrial would create an issue of double jeopardy. The court rejected this argument, finding that the trial court did not “falsify” reasons for the mistrial and that there was a “manifest necessity” for a second trial. The court further expressed concern over the problems of technology during a trial, stating, “after the jury had been exposed to the extraneous information, ‘the interests of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the [trial] proceedings[,],' and that manifest necessity existed to declare a mistrial.” The opinion continued by saying, “Because the mistrial was supported by a valid determination of manifest necessity, the second trial that resulted in [the defendant’s] conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy clause.”

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Slavick_v_Sequeira_No_1500424_DKWKJM_2016_BL_314700_D_Haw_Sept_23?1476465528 

Prosecutor Baiting a Mistrial Bars Any Future Retrial for the Same Crime

After making flagrant statements at trial in an attempt to provoke a mistrial, a prosecutor created a double-jeopardy bar against retrying the same defendant

State v. Zisa, N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., No. 10-10-01812-I, 8/23/16.

   The New Jersey Supreme Court found that purposefully unprofessional conduct on behalf of the prosecution team in a criminal trial in an attempt to bait a mistrial bars a retrial of a defendant. This case follows a similar line of cases stemming from Oregon v. Kennedy, which barred retrials after a successful defense motion for a mistrial if the defendant could show that the prosecutor in the case purposefully provoked the defense to make the mistrial motion in the first place.
 

   The court reached its conclusions because the prosecutor continuously made inadmissible, improper, and prejudicial statements about the evidence and facts about a state witness, even though it was unsubstantiated and inadmissible. The court said, “It strains credulity that such a seasoned prosecutor, with years of trial experience, could be so ignorant to the rules of evidence.” Additionally, the court noted the prosecutor’s unusual ambivalence towards the five mistrial motions made by the defense. 
 

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