Congress Expansion Over Federal Inmates in Local Jail is Constitutional

Congress may make it a crime for federal inmates to commit sexual assaults while being held in state or local facilities.

 

United States v. Mujahid, 2015 BL 276994, 9th Cir., No. 11-30276

    The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 2006 expansion of federal jurisdiction to cover state or local facilities housing federal prisoners falls within Congress's power. The expansion does not usurp state authority, and is within Congress's power to enact laws that are "necessary and proper" to ensure that federal prisoners are incarcerated in an orderly and safe manner.

    The necessary and proper clause allows Congress to enact laws that are rationally related to the implementation of its enumerated powers, the court ruled. The court determined that the expansion of jurisdictional reach of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2244 to include sex offenses occurring "in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General," indicating that this is a modest addition to a long history of regulation in this area.

    The court continued, "[a]lthough the state courts already criminalize this type of conduct, Congress didn't overreach merely by implementing a system that is "concurrent and complementary."

    “Congress has long been involved in legislating the terms of federal imprisonment,” and this extension is reasonably adapted to Congress's power to act as a “responsible federal custodian,” the court said.
 
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Mujahid_No_1130276_2015_BL_276994_9th_Cir_Aug_27_

Registration Deadlines for SORNA Clarified.

The concepts of being required to register, and failing to register, are separate within the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.

 

United States v. Gundy, 2015 BL 295714, 2d Cir., No. 13-3679-cr, 9/14/15

    The defendant was in prison when the sex offender federal registration requirements were deemed retroactive. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that he violated the law by traveling interstate even though it occurred while he was still in custody and before he had finished serving his sentence. 

    In 2005 the defendant had been convicted of a sex offense in Maryland. This conviction violated the terms of his federal supervised release, so he was transferred to a federal facility in Pennsylvania in 2011, and in 2012, to a halfway house in the Bronx, N.Y. The government indicted him for his failure to register as a sex offender and then traveling interstate. Their argument remarked that the SORNA requirements had been made retroactive in 2008.

    The defendant claimed that he did not have to "initially register" until he had completed the sentence of imprisonment.

    The court found that the defendant conflated the statute's deadlines for registering initially with the section of the statute that establishes mandatory registration conditions. The court stated that the defendant's  argument did not give enough credence to the fact that 18 U.S.C. §2250(a) treats being required to register and failing to register "as separate and distinct elements of the criminal offense."

    The court did not determine whether his travel falls outside of Section 2250 because he remained in federal custody the entire time. They indicated that the district court had not ruled on that point.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Gundy_No_133679cr_2015_BL_295714_2d_Cir_Sept_14_2

Only One Party Needs to Consent to Telephone Taps in Connecticut.

As long as one party to a conversation gives consent, the Connecticut Constitution does not require police to obtain a warrant before recording phone calls.

 

State v. Skok, 2015 BL 289964, Conn., No. SC 19415, 9/15/15

     The Connecticut Supreme Court indicated that all federal courts and an "overwhelming majority" of state courts follow the one-party-consent exception to the warrant requirement. The reasoning of these courts is that a person using a phone to further criminal activity does not have control over who the other person shares the conversation with, or allows to listen in.

     The court here also indicated that the defendant's claim of reasonable expectation of privacy was undermined because she repeatedly reminded the other party to make sure that family members would not overhear the conversations.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/State_v_Skok_No_SC_19415_2015_BL_289964_Conn_Sept_15_2015_Court_O

Forced Departure Deemed 'Seizure' Due to Rough Handling.

When an officer roughly grabs a person, an order to depart becomes a Fourth Amendment seizure.

 

Salmon v. Blesser, 2015 BL 292438, 2d Cir., No. 14-1993-cv, 9/10/15

    The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said that, though the use of physical force to restrain someone and control their movements may or may not be reasonable under the circumstances, it still constitutes a seizure. Circuit precedent indicates that an order to leave, by itself, is not a seizure. The precedent even indicates that if the person is escorted by an officer as they leave, gives gentle physical guidance, or bars reentry, it is not a seizure.

    However, in this lawsuit the officer grabbed the plaintiff by the collar and twisted his arm behind his back. The court ruled that this was "intentionally restraining and controlling" the plaintiff's movements, and was elevated to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Salmon_v_Blesser_No_141993cv_2015_BL_292438_2d_Cir_Sept_10_2015_C

Stop Justified When Wide Truck Crossed Fog Line Twice

Crossing the fog line twice, even in a wide truck, is enough reasonably suspicion to justify pulling it over.

 

United States v. Diaz, 2015 BL 289363, 2d Cir., No. 14-2505, 9/8/15

     The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district judge's suppression order even though they agreed that many things could reasonably be the cause for a driver's failure to stay in the lane perfectly. The court stated that "a momentary but reasonable loss of attention because of the appearance of an insect in the cab, or a sudden loud sound or flash of light" could cause a momentary crossing over the fog line.

     The court concluded, however, that the test is not whether the driver was actually careless or violated a traffic law, but whether an objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that a violation occurred. Here, the court said, the officer's suspicion that a violation had occurred was reasonable because the truck crossed the fog line twice.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Diaz_No_142505_2015_BL_289363_2d_Cir_Sept_08_2015