Texting-While-Driving, Almost Unenforceable in Indiana

Seeing a motorist doing something on their phone does not, by itself, give reasonable suspicion to stop them for violating the texting-while-driving ban.

 

United States v. Paniagua-Garcia, 2016 BL 46039, 7th Cir., No. 15-2540, 2/18/16

     The defendant was pulled over because the officer said that he "appeared" to be texting on his phone's key pad. The court ruled that because it was just as likely that he was doing something that was not prohibited, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion. The Indiana law bans texting, but allows all other uses.

     The state's argument essentially claimed that the mere possibility that someone is engaging in a criminal act creates a reasonable suspicion. The court determined that this is too broad, and that "[w]hat [the government] calls reasonable suspicion, we call suspicion."

     There was no evidence of erratic driving or anything else to bolster the police officer's suspicion. The court said that if the government stance was correct, the police could stop any driver they saw drinking from a coffee cup on the suspicion that the coffee was spiked with booze because it is illegal to drink alcohol while driving.


http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_PaniaguaGarcia_No_152540_2016_BL_46039_7th_Cir_Fe?1456852336

No Right For DUI Suspect To Choose BAC Test

Under Pennsylvania's implied-consent law, drivers do not have the right to choose the type of blood-alcohol test they will submit to when they are arrested for suspected DUI.

 

Nardone v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., 2015 BL 429928, Pa., No. 141 MAP 2014, 12/29/15

    Similar to Utah's implied consent law, Pennsylvania's law states that all motorists "are deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine." 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §1547. The court said that that language does not mean the police must offer the suspect a "menu of choices."

    "By implicitly consenting to any and all chemical tests in Section 1547(a), a motorist arrested for DUI is subject to any and all tests, and he effectively relinquishes any right to choose his preferred test over an officers," the court stated.

    The court continued, saying "[i]t could not have been the General Assembly's intent to establish a rule of implied consent at the outset of the statutory scheme only to immediately thereafter devise a procedure for obtaining chemical testing that would nullify the rule."

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/JOHN_D_NARDONE_APPELLANT_V_COMMONWEALTH_OF_PENNSYLVANIA_DEPARTMEN?1452267926

'Seizure' Only After Driver Obeyed Police Orders

A seizure does not occur until a suspect actually capitulates to a show of authority.

 

United States v. Stover, 2015 BL 416751, 4th Cir., No. 14-4283, 12/18/15

    A driver exited his truck and threw a pistol into the grass before he complied with the police officer's command to return to the vehicle. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that he abandoned the weapon before he was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

    The court indicated that a seizure does not occur until a suspect actually capitulates to a show of authority, and the defendant did not submit until he had already ditched the pistol. The court did not accept the defendant's argument that the pistol was the fruit of an illegal seizure because the police seized him without reasonable suspicion when they pulled up behind his truck, turned on their lights, and blocked him from driving away.

    The court hearkened to the ruling in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), which held that a police officer's "show of authority" does not, alone constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure unless and until the suspect submits. Here, the court rejected the proposition that anything short of headlong flight qualifies as submission and ruled that merely remaining at the scene does not qualify as submission.    

    The court stated that because the defendant gave no indication that he was submitting until after he discarded the pistol, he was not "seized" until he did indicate submission. "Only after he discarded that gun and was confronted by an armed police officer did Stover submit to police authority," the court said.

Stop Justified When Wide Truck Crossed Fog Line Twice

Crossing the fog line twice, even in a wide truck, is enough reasonably suspicion to justify pulling it over.

 

United States v. Diaz, 2015 BL 289363, 2d Cir., No. 14-2505, 9/8/15

     The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district judge's suppression order even though they agreed that many things could reasonably be the cause for a driver's failure to stay in the lane perfectly. The court stated that "a momentary but reasonable loss of attention because of the appearance of an insect in the cab, or a sudden loud sound or flash of light" could cause a momentary crossing over the fog line.

     The court concluded, however, that the test is not whether the driver was actually careless or violated a traffic law, but whether an objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that a violation occurred. Here, the court said, the officer's suspicion that a violation had occurred was reasonable because the truck crossed the fog line twice.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Diaz_No_142505_2015_BL_289363_2d_Cir_Sept_08_2015