20-Year Delay Not A Speedy Trial

The government is responsible for a 20-year delay in prosecution when they neglected to bring the case before in spite of various opportunities.

 

City of Grand Forks v. Gale, 2016 BL 78728, N.D., No. 20150204, 3/15/16

     The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the city was mostly responsible for this delay because prosecutors did not try to find the defendant after he failed to appear at a scheduled sentencing for a plea deal in 1995.

     The court said that they "will not excuse defendants on speedy trial grounds when they purposefully evade prosecution, but we also cannot excuse the government when it does not fulfill its burden of diligent prosecution." The court indicated that both parties bore some responsibility, but that the city was more culpable because an accused is not responsible for his prosecution.

     Though the defendant had moved to Colorado, he had reappeared in North Dakota courts on various occasions for criminal and child support hearings, and the city did not try to execute the 1995 warrant until 20 years after the fact. The court looked at the four-part test in Barker v. Wingo, which weighs the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy-trial right, and any prejudice.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/City_of_Grand_Forks_v_Gale_2016_ND_58_Court_Opinion?1459439254

Warrantless Blood Draw Justified By Broken Intoxilyzer

A blood draw performed without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances after the officer attempted to use the police station's Intoxilyzer machine, but it was not functioning correctly.

 

State v. Arndt, 2016 BL 45450, Me., Sag-15-150, 2/18/16

     The deputy attempted four times to use the Intoxilyzer to obtain a blood-alcohol reading from a suspected drunk driver, but the machine was not functioning correctly. Because time was running out, as any alcohol in the blood stream was dissipating, the deputy had a paramedic take a sample of the suspect's blood.

     The Maine Supreme Court determined that the deputy's decision was reasonable, and did not go against Missouri vi McNeely, because 90 minutes had passed and he feared that the evidence would be lost because the Intoxilyzer was broken. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct 1552 (2013). 

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/State_v_Arndt_2016_ME_31_Court_Opinion?1457544612

Massachusetts Supreme Court Differs from SCOTUS Over Anonymous Tip

An anonymous tip about an apparent drunk driver does not, by itself, give the police reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the suspected motorist.

 

Commonwealth v. Depiero, 2015 BL 435626, Mass., No. SJC-11893, 1/4/16

    An anonymous tipster called 9-1-1 and complained about an apparently drunk driver.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that this, by itself, did not give the police reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the suspected drunk driver.

    The court's decision does not follow the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Navarette v. California, which says that anonymous calls are normally reliable because caller ID technology makes prank calls unlikely. In this case, the court indicated that caller ID technology is irrelevant if the caller does not know about it, and a tipster might instead be a prankster.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Commonwealth_v_Depiero_No_SJC11893_2015_BL_435626_Mass_Jan_04_201

No Right For DUI Suspect To Choose BAC Test

Under Pennsylvania's implied-consent law, drivers do not have the right to choose the type of blood-alcohol test they will submit to when they are arrested for suspected DUI.

 

Nardone v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., 2015 BL 429928, Pa., No. 141 MAP 2014, 12/29/15

    Similar to Utah's implied consent law, Pennsylvania's law states that all motorists "are deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine." 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §1547. The court said that that language does not mean the police must offer the suspect a "menu of choices."

    "By implicitly consenting to any and all chemical tests in Section 1547(a), a motorist arrested for DUI is subject to any and all tests, and he effectively relinquishes any right to choose his preferred test over an officers," the court stated.

    The court continued, saying "[i]t could not have been the General Assembly's intent to establish a rule of implied consent at the outset of the statutory scheme only to immediately thereafter devise a procedure for obtaining chemical testing that would nullify the rule."

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/JOHN_D_NARDONE_APPELLANT_V_COMMONWEALTH_OF_PENNSYLVANIA_DEPARTMEN?1452267926