Broad Definition of "Violent Felony" Deemed Unconstitutional

The definition of "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague.

Johnson v. United States, 2015 BL 204915, U.S., No. 13-7120

 

     The Supreme Court looked to the history of "repeated failure[s] to craft a principled standard out of" the definition of "violent felony" in the ACCA. The Court indicated that "nine years' experience trying to derive meaning from the residual clause convinces  us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise."

 

     The wording of the Act was vague and the Court said that "invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process."

 

     In this case, the defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. This conviction was enhanced inder the ACCA. He argued, as many others before, that his particular state offense did not qualify as a "violent felony."

 

     The old standard was a categorical approach, given in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and required sentencing courts to assess the crime "in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion."

 

    Justice Scalia, writing for the court, said that "the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges." Thus, increasing a defendant's sentence under the definition of "violent felony" given in the ACAA denies due process of the law.

 

    The lack of guidance within the clause was integral to the Court's decision. It fails to indicate how to estimate the risk posed by a crime, and how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.

 

    This decision is a major change in the law that affects a large number of defendents who have been sentenced for firearms offenses.