Death During Botched Execution Does Not Create Eighth Amendment Claim

An execution that left the inmate in serious pain for 43 minutes was not cruel and unusual punishment because the botched procedure was an isolated mishap, barring the defendant's estate from pursing an Eight Amendment claim 

Estate of Lockett v. Fallin, 2016 BL 379808, 10th Cir., No. 15-6134, 11/15/16.

The Tenth Circuit found that a botched execution does not create an Eighth Amendment claim on behalf of ax executed inmate because such a mishap was isolated and there will always be inherent pain associated with an execution. The decision clarified whether an inmate’s estate can maintain a claim of “cruel and unusual punishment” by only showing that the execution was a painful procedure.  The cause of the botched procedure was due to a poorly inserted IV by the prison’s staff that did not efficiently supply the deadly cocktail of drugs. The court found that mistakes such as this did not reach the level of “torture or deliberate indifference” in sustaining an Eighth Amendment claim. Additionally, the court rejected the estate’s argument that the state was indifferent about the well-being of the inmate by using a new cocktail of lethal drugs. The change in drugs was not due to indifference, but due to a lack of the other drugs that have been used before.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Estate_of_Lockett_v_Fallin_No_156134_2016_BL_379808_10th_Cir_Nov_.

Recent SCOTUS Decision Does Not Retroactively Apply to Juvenile Plea Bargain

A plea bargain entered by a defendant to avoid the death penalty as a juvenile is not retroactively affected by a Supreme Court decision that found juvenile death sentences to be unconstitutional

Dingle v. Stevenson, 2016 BL 354573, 4th Cir., No. 15-6832, 10/25/16.

The Fourth Circuit did not expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) to retroactively apply to defendants who entered into plea deals to avoid the death penalty as juveniles. In the original case, the defendant avoided a possible death penalty or life sentence without parole by entering into a plea deal while he was still seventeen. The defendant argued that his plea was involuntary because he was threatened with what is now considered an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. The court, however, found that his guilty plea and subsequent sentence were entirely unrelated to the Supreme Court’s decision. The court stated that “[A]lthough Roper, in hindsight, altered the calculus underlying Dingle's decision to accept a plea agreement, it does not undermine the voluntariness of his plea.”  The Supreme Court’s decision only applies if the defendant is actually sentenced to death or life without parole.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Dingle_v_Stevenson_No_156832_2016_BL_354573_4th_Cir_Oct_25_2016_C.

Restitution Allowed to be Condition of Supervised Release

Restitution can have a punitive effect, but it has a primarily remedial and compensatory effect that does not violate excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment

United States v. Alvarez, 2016 BL 286186, 9th Cir., No. 14-50506, 8/1/16.

   The Ninth Circuit found that restitution as a condition of a supervised release is not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The defendant claimed that restitution paid towards to a car rental agency after damaging one of their vehicles, was excessive because the restitution was part of his punishment. The court noted that there may be a “secondary punitive” effect of paying restitution, but its effect is primarily remedial and compensatory. Without being punishment, the judge can set the restitution payments and without the aid of the jury as trier of fact.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Alvarez_No_1450506_2016_BL_286186_9th_Cir_Sept_01.