Recent SCOTUS Decision Does Not Retroactively Apply to Juvenile Plea Bargain

A plea bargain entered by a defendant to avoid the death penalty as a juvenile is not retroactively affected by a Supreme Court decision that found juvenile death sentences to be unconstitutional

Dingle v. Stevenson, 2016 BL 354573, 4th Cir., No. 15-6832, 10/25/16.

The Fourth Circuit did not expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) to retroactively apply to defendants who entered into plea deals to avoid the death penalty as juveniles. In the original case, the defendant avoided a possible death penalty or life sentence without parole by entering into a plea deal while he was still seventeen. The defendant argued that his plea was involuntary because he was threatened with what is now considered an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. The court, however, found that his guilty plea and subsequent sentence were entirely unrelated to the Supreme Court’s decision. The court stated that “[A]lthough Roper, in hindsight, altered the calculus underlying Dingle's decision to accept a plea agreement, it does not undermine the voluntariness of his plea.”  The Supreme Court’s decision only applies if the defendant is actually sentenced to death or life without parole.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Dingle_v_Stevenson_No_156832_2016_BL_354573_4th_Cir_Oct_25_2016_C.

'All Passwords' Condition to Parole is Overbroad

A probation condition which requires a juvenile convicted of burglary to surrender every password used in his electronic devices, and to submit to warrantless searches of those devices, is overbroad.

 

People v. Ricardo P., 2015 BL 348208, Cal. Ct. App., No. A144149, 10/22/15

   A juvenile was sentenced to parole conditions requiring that he surrender all of the passwords for accounts in his electronic devices, and to submit to warrantless searches of those devices. The California Court of Appeal, First District, ruled that those conditions were not tailored narrowly enough to the purpose of rehabilitating the specific offender. The conditions did not minimize interference with his Constitutional rights to privacy, speech, and association.

    The court accepted that a condition for the search of an offender's electronics can be permitted so long as it is reasonably related to the goal of preventing future criminality, but that this condition as the court "interpreted it, does not limit the types of data on or accessible through his cell phone that may be searched in light of this purpose."

    The condition is overly broad because it "permits review of all sorts of private information that is highly unlikely to shed any light on whether Ricardo is complying with the other conditions of his probation, drug-related, or otherwise."

    The case was remanded to the juvenile court to tailor the conditions to fit the offender's situation given the criminal history.

    The court did also not completely write off this type of parole condition. The court recognized a sister appellate court's case about the surrender of all passwords in a case involving gang activity. In that case the 'all passwords' condition was acceptable because the offender had admitted to gang activity and there was evidence that he'd used social media to promote gang activity.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/People_v_Ricardo_P_No_A144149_2015_BL_348208_Cal_App_1st_Dist_Oct?1448298181