Cockfighting Is Not Considered a Per Se Crime of Moral Turpitude

A misdemeanor conviction for cockfighting does not necessarily rise to the level of a crime of moral turpitude that would block an immigrant from contesting his removal from the United States

Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch, 2016 BL 273130, 9th Cir., No. 13-71127, 8/23/16.

   The Ninth Circuit overturned the Board of Immigration Appeals in its determination that cockfighting categorically falls into crimes of moral turpitude, based on actions that involve “base and depraved” conduct. Although cockfighting is outlawed everywhere in the U.S., crimes of moral turpitude must involve harm towards someone or conduct that impacts a protected class of victims. It was noted that cockfighting is legal in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/OrtegaLopez_v_Lynch_No_1371127_2016_BL_273130_9th_Cir_Aug_23_2016.

Jurisdictional Elements in Aggravated Felonies for Immigrants Are Immaterial for Conviction

A state offense is considered an aggravated felony when it meets the elements of the matching federal crime, even when it lacks a similar jurisdictional element found in the federal statute

Torres v. Lynch, 2016 BL 159420, U.S., No. 14-1096, 5/19/16.

   Aggravated felonies can now include state offenses that match elements of a federal crime listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) without the jurisdictional elements. These offenses, without the interstate or foreign commerce element used to establish federal jurisdiction, will make it easier to deport or deny discretionary relief to immigrants convicted of such felonies.

   The ruling will uphold the position that several circuit courts have taken, such as the Second and Ninth Circuits were the bulk of immigration cases take place. This ruling, however, will prevent “long-time legal permanent residents with convictions for minor state offenses [from] appealing to the sound discretion of the Attorney General to obtain relief from removal.” As the dissenting opinion notes, they would have liked to preserve “more possibilities for immigration judges to consider individual equities and circumstances in determining the appropriateness of deportation.”

   Judges in analyzing cases involving aggravated felonies will now have less discretion in granting relief, but immigration judges deciding whether to grant relief from removal can still consider the seriousness of any offense, including aggravated felonies.  Ultimately, this decision prevents statutory loopholes that may prevent removal of some immigrants in the country after committing state felonies that lacked a jurisdictional element tying it to the INA.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Luna_Torres_v_Lynch_No_141096_US_May_19_2016_Court_Opinion?1465323537