Judge Under Investigation Should Have Recused Himself From Trial

A trial judge that was under a bribery investigation by the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting a defendant in his court should have recused himself from the trial

Rippo v. Baker, U.S., No. 16-6316, 3/6/17.

The United States Supreme Court held that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a judge recuse himself while under criminal investigation by the same prosecuting office as a defendant in his court. Before trial, the defendant moved to have the judge recuse himself because of the possibility the judge would not be impartial in adjudicating the criminal proceedings. The motion was denied and the defendant sentenced to death. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, finding that the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “has no actual bias.” In their opinion, the court found that “Recusal is required when….the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-6316_32h6.pdf

Juror’s Racial Bias Enough to Impeach Verdict and Set New Trial

Revelations of a juror’s racial bias during deliberation opens up the jury verdict to impeachment and allows a court to considers the statement’s in whether to grant a new trial.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).

The Supreme Court held that statements made by a juror during a trial that espouses animus or a bias based on race may violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. In the case, the defendant was convicted of several sex crimes involving minors. After the trial, the defense counsel spoke to jurors about the case and during the conversation, two jurors came forward to alert the defense counsel that one juror made racially disparaging remarks about the defendant to garner support for the conviction verdict. After this discovery, the counsel for the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court, however, denied the motion under the Colorado rule modeled after FRE 606(b), which prohibits the impeachment of a jury verdict based on statements made by a juror.

The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Colorado courts, noting the historical racial bias “implicates unique historical constitutional, and institutional concerns.” Moreover, the court stated “Racial bias is distinct in a pragmatic sense,” while there are safeguards such voir dire or juror observation during the trial, these mechanisms “may be compromised, or….prove insufficient.”

When there is a case where a juror makes a “clear statement that indicates…racial stereotypes or animus [used] to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule gives way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” To show that a racially biased statement impeded a fair trial, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made overtly biased statements that raise doubt on the fairness of the jury deliberations and verdict. The statement must also “show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-606_886b.pdf

Reversal of Death Sentence Due to the Testimony of the Victim’s Family

During sentencing, courts cannot allow relatives of a murder victim present victim-impact statements that recommend that the killer be sentenced to death, restricting earlier Supreme Court precedent.

Bosse v. Oklahoma, 2016 BL 338178, U.S., No. 15-9173, 10/11/16.

The United States Supreme Court reversed a death row inmate’s sentence because of victim-impact statements made by the family that suggested the death penalty for the convict were improper. This decision clarifies an earlier ruling from 1991 that allowed certain victim-impact statements to be used during trial, limiting the statements from directly recommending to the jury how to convict and sentence a defendant.

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Bosse_v_Okla_No_159173_2016_BL_338133_US_Oct_11_2016_Court_Opinio?1476478854

Mandatory Blood Tests Violate the Fourth Amendment

States cannot require blood tests as part of their implied-consent laws to determine a drunk driver’s BAC when criminal penalties are imposed for refusing to take a test

Birchfield v. North Dakota, U.S., No. 14-1468, 6/23/16.

   This decision combines three similar cases that involve searches incident to an arrest resulting from drunk driving. In each of the three cases, the laws of the state in which they were arrested had implied consent laws that obligated a driver to agree to a BAC test as a condition of driving. The drivers in the three cases were subjected and informed of their respective states’ implied consent laws after being found to be intoxicated by a police officer. One refused a blood test and was charged with a misdemeanor according to the state law. Another agreed to a breath test, failed, and was further prosecuted. Another agreed to a blood test, failed the blood test, and was also further prosecuted. In all three cases, the drivers appealed their convictions on the ground that the warrantless BAC tests were unreasonable and violated their Fourth Amendment rights because of the criminal penalties associated with the implied consent laws.

   The Court began by establishing the reasonableness of searches-incident-to-arrest. It then continued by discussing how breath and blood tests implicate the Fourth Amendment, but noting that breath tests do not “implicate significant privacy concerns.” Further into the opinion, the Court elaborated on breath tests, finding them to be as intrusive as or even less intrusive than other tests that have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment, including mouth swabs and fingernail scrapings. The Court found that breath tests also limit the amount of information measured and are no more of an embarrassing act than blowing into a straw. The opinion also found that blood tests are more intrusive than a breath test, pointing to how such tests provide more information than a breath reading and are more embarrassing because of how they induce anxiety for some.

   In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court found “that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving,” explaining that a breath test’s impact on privacy is minimal and the need for BAC testing is great. For blood tests, however, the Court reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the blood tests are overly intrusive in light of alternatives, making them unreasonable without a warrant. Drivers could not be criminally punished for refusing a blood test based on an implied-consent law, but a breath test can be used without a warrant, allowing for their use in states with implied-consent laws.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1468_8n59.pdf.

Firearm Ban for Committing Domestic Violence Upheld

A lifetime firearms ban is upheld for convictions of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, including a conviction for reckless domestic assault 

Voisine v. United States, U.S., 14–10154, 6/27/16.

   The Supreme Court upheld a federal law that creates a lifetime ban for those convicted of domestic violence crimes, including misdemeanors, from owning a firearm. The Court analyzed the statutory text, coupled with the context of the passage of the act prohibiting firearm ownership, and recognized the recklessness standard for triggering the ban. The Court focused on the statute’s reference of “use…of physical force,” noting that there was no distinction between domestic assaults that were knowingly or intentionally committed and those that were committed recklessly when such force was used. The court continued by saying thee ultimate purpose of the statute was “to take guns out of the hands of abusers convicted under the misdemeanor assault laws then in general use in the States,” which the majority of states have already extended to encompass reckless assaults.

http://src.bna.com/ggr

Corruption Conviction of Former Governor Thrown Out

The definition for an “official act” under the corruption statute is too expansive and should be limited to decisions or actions “in such the official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust and profit.”

 McDonnell v. United States, No. 15–474, U.S., 6/27/16.

   The corruption conviction of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell was overturned by the Supreme Court because the definition used by the Fourth Circuit for an “official act” was too expansive. As described by the Court, “[a]n official act is defined as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.” Only formal government actions or administrative determinations are subject to being considered an “official act,” not routine political courtesies.

   The Court remanded the case back to the lower courts to determine if there was evidence of McDonnell committing an “official act” under the new definition offered in the decision. If there was evidence, then a new trial may be required. Prosecutors in the case worry that this decision will make it more difficult for future prosecutions of politicians that violate corruption and bribery laws.

http://src.bna.com/ggx

State Offenses Broader Than Federal Statute Prevent Sentencing Enhancement

State statutes that provide multiple elements and alternatives for a single crime cannot trigger a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act

Mathis v. United States, U.S., No. 15-6092, 6/23/16.

   A defendant convicted for burglary under a state statute that included a broader definition than which is found under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). The federal statute defined burglary as “an unlawful entry into a building or other structure,” while the Iowan statute’s definition of burglary encompassed more, including unlawful entry into any “building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.”

   In response, the court said, “For more than 25 years, our decisions have held that the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense,” Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the 5-3 majority. “The question in this case is whether ACCA makes an exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an exception.”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-6092_1an2.pdf

Tribal Sovereignty Upheld as Right to Counsel Does Not Extend to Tribal Courts

The Supreme Court found that misdemeanor domestic violence convictions in tribal courts can be considered predicate offenses under the Violence Against Woman Act, even when defendants are without counsel in earlier tribal convictions.

United States v. Bryant, 2016 BL 187309, U.S., No. 15-420, 6/13/16.

   In resolving a circuit split, the Supreme Court ruled that misdemeanor domestic violence convictions in tribal court can qualify as predicate offenses for the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The underlying question was whether these earlier convictions in tribal court, where counsel was not appointed, violated due process. The court found that these convictions complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act, thereby avoiding any due process claims under the Sixth Amendment, which does not extend to tribal court proceedings to maintain the court’s sovereignty.

   The “Indian Civil Rights Act, which governs criminal proceedings in tribal courts, requires appointed counsel only when a sentence of more than one year's imprisonment is imposed. [Defendant’s] tribal-court convictions, it is undisputed, were valid when entered.” Since the convictions were constitutional, they could count towards VAWA’s provisions regarding domestic violence on Indian reservations, which require any subsequent conviction after two previous convictions to be considered a felony.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Bryant_No_15420_2016_BL_187309_US_June_13_2016_Co.

Without Recusal, State Judge Violated Due Process

After authorizing prosecutors to seek the death penalty as a former district attorney, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice should have recused himself to avoid violating the due process rights of the convict

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 2016 BL 184130, U.S., No. 15-5040, 6/9/16.

    The Supreme Court found that a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice should have recused himself in hearing a habeas corpus petition by a convict on death row. The conflict of interest arose because the justice was a former District Attorney that authorized prosecutors to seek the death penalty against this same convict almost 30 years ago.

   The court in making this decision found that the justice’s participation violated the “due process maxim” that “no man can be a judge in his own case.” The state argued that the justice, as a district attorney, only participated in the case as an administrator, but the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument. They found that during his candidacy for the state supreme court he used the convict and other death penalty sentences to support his platform, thereby taking responsibility for the conviction and sentence.

   In the dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that due process is only violated “when a judge adjudicates the same question—based on the same facts—that he had already considered as a grand juror in the same case.” He agreed that the Pennsylvania justice should have recused himself, but not due to a constitutional concern, but rather a concern of the states in setting forth its own judicial procedures.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Williams_v_Pennsylvania_No_155040_US_June_09_2016_Court_Opinion?1466019882

Does Modern Standard of Intellecutal Disability Apply to 35-Year Old Death Sentence?

After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court will determine whether the modern standard of an intellectual disability applies for a conviction after a 35-year delay for an execution

 Moore v Texas, U.S. No 15-797, cert. granted 6/6/16.

   The Supreme Court will review whether modern medical standards, not those at the time of conviction, should be used to determine if a defendant has an intellectual disability making him ineligible for the death penalty. Initially, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found Moore did not show by a preponderance of evidence that he was intellectually disabled, thereby making him eligible for execution. This ruling, however, does not take into consideration new standards adopted by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities and the American Psychiatric Association after the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, which held that the Eight Amendment prevents the death penalty from being imposed on those with intellectual disabilities.

Supreme Court Remands PLRA Case

The Supreme Court, in remanding a Prison Litigation Reform Act case to the circuit court, hints that administrative remedies provided by the state were so confusing that they effectively became “unavailable.”

Ross v. Blake, U.S., No. 15-339, 6/6/16.

After a complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), an inmate’s case will be remanded back to the circuit court after the Supreme Court received new documents detailing the state’s confusing administrative remedies provided to prisoners, which the Supreme Court suggested that the remedies were so confusing that they negate any administrative relief.

Initially, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if special circumstance could be created under the PLRA for an inmate who thought he exhausted every remedy before filing a civil suit, but did not. After receiving new documents detailing the administrative procedures provided by the state for inmates, the case was remanded back to the circuit court to review the same question in light of the new documents being provided by the parties.

Additionally, the Supreme Court asked the circuit court to determine whether “Maryland officials thwarted the effective invocation of the administration process through threats, game-playing, or misrepresentations, either on a system-wide basis or in the individual case[.]”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-339_1b7d.pdf

Jurisdictional Elements in Aggravated Felonies for Immigrants Are Immaterial for Conviction

A state offense is considered an aggravated felony when it meets the elements of the matching federal crime, even when it lacks a similar jurisdictional element found in the federal statute

Torres v. Lynch, 2016 BL 159420, U.S., No. 14-1096, 5/19/16.

   Aggravated felonies can now include state offenses that match elements of a federal crime listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) without the jurisdictional elements. These offenses, without the interstate or foreign commerce element used to establish federal jurisdiction, will make it easier to deport or deny discretionary relief to immigrants convicted of such felonies.

   The ruling will uphold the position that several circuit courts have taken, such as the Second and Ninth Circuits were the bulk of immigration cases take place. This ruling, however, will prevent “long-time legal permanent residents with convictions for minor state offenses [from] appealing to the sound discretion of the Attorney General to obtain relief from removal.” As the dissenting opinion notes, they would have liked to preserve “more possibilities for immigration judges to consider individual equities and circumstances in determining the appropriateness of deportation.”

   Judges in analyzing cases involving aggravated felonies will now have less discretion in granting relief, but immigration judges deciding whether to grant relief from removal can still consider the seriousness of any offense, including aggravated felonies.  Ultimately, this decision prevents statutory loopholes that may prevent removal of some immigrants in the country after committing state felonies that lacked a jurisdictional element tying it to the INA.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Luna_Torres_v_Lynch_No_141096_US_May_19_2016_Court_Opinion?1465323537

After 30 Years, Race-Biased Conviction Overturned

Striking potential jurors based on race is unconstitutional, reaffirming earlier Supreme Court ruling preventing the use of race in jury selection

Foster v. Chatman, 2016 BL 162869, U.S., No. 14-8349, reversed and remanded 5/23/16

 

    The United States Supreme Court ruled that peremptory jury strikes motivated by race are impermissible, reaffirming the court’s 1986 ruling in Batson v. Kentucky.  Annotations along names of black jurors, such as “Definite No” and “No. No Black Church” were “as clear as a Batson violation as a court is ever going to see.”

    

   The Supreme Court focused on two jurors who were stricken. The state offered 11 neutral, non-race based reasons for striking the first juror and eight reasons for the second juror. The Court, however, found the reasons unconvincing and merely suggested pretext. In the opinion, the Court notes the “focus on race in the prosecution’s file plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.” 

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Foster_v_Chatman_No_148349_2016_BL_162869_US_May_23_2016_Court_Op