Buying Drugs with a Gun Does Not Require Heightened Sentences

A gun used to purchase drugs does not qualify a defendant for longer sentences under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

 United States v. Gates, 2017 BL 879, 7th Cir., No. 16-2193, 1/4/17.

The Seventh Circuit ruled that sentence enhancement for the commission of a drug crime cannot stem from the presence of a weapon used only for the exchange of drugs. The court recognized that the enhancement is generally applied only when the weapon is used in the commission of the drug crime. In this case, the gun was used as payment for drugs and as satisfaction for a prior debt. The court, noting how little a role the weapon played in the actual exchange, even outlined how the gun was stored and transported before the drug deal.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Gates_No_162193_2017_BL_879_7th_Cir_Jan_04_2017_C/1.

Ohio: Juvenile Adjudication Cannot be used as Priors in Adult Sentencing

Ohio joins a number of jurisdictions preventing juvenile adjudications to be used as prior convictions during sentencing for adults because it violates due process principals

State v. Hand, 2016 BL 276326, Ohio, No. 2014-1814, 8/25/16.

   The Ohio Supreme Court held that a state statute allowing juvenile convictions to count as priors during sentencing as an adult was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and its line of case law. It found that such statutes violate due process requirements because there is not a right to a jury in juvenile cases. The supreme court followed Apprendi, finding that a right to a jury trial is required because “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   While many federal circuit courts have issued opinions regarding this issue, finding that juvenile crimes can be used to enhance subsequent adult sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act, state supreme courts are divided on the same issue. Ohio joins the minority of jurisdictions that do not enhance sentences based on juvenile adjudication.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/State_v_Hand_2016Ohio5504_Ohio_Aug_25_2016_Court_Opinion.

Defendant Cannot Attack State Sentence in Appealing his Federal Sentence

A defendant cannot appeal his federal sentence by attacking the validity of his initial state sentence by arguing that the federal sentence is unconstitutional because it runs consecutively to his state sentence.

United States v. Napolitan, 2016 BL 230906, 3d Cir., No. 15-1602, 7/19/16.

   A Third Circuit court ruled that a defendant cannot challenge his federal sentence by attacking the state sentence he had already received. This decision continues and expands upon the line of cases stemming from Custis v. United States, which prevents federal defendants from mounting attacks against past convictions that were used as prior convictions for sentencing enhancement. In this case, the defendant argued that his federal sentence was unconstitutional because it ran consecutively to his state sentence, which he contended was invalid. The court ruled that “Drawing on both the logic and language of Custis, we see no reason why state sentences should not be accorded the same respect and be subject to the same forms of substantive review afforded to state convictions.” The court then joined the Ninth, Sixth, and Second circuits and extended Custis to prevent attacks on prior convictions.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Napolitan_No_151602_2016_BL_230906_3d_Cir_July_19.

nder New York Law, Robbery Not Necessarily “Crime of Violence” for Career Criminal Enhancements

After reviewing the New York statute on first-degree robbery, a federal circuit court held that language in the statute prevents it from being an inherent “crime of violence” for federal sentencing guidelines

United States v. Jones, 2016 BL 233942, 2d Cir., No. 15-1518-cr, 7/21/16.

The Second Circuit held that robbery is not necessarily a “crime of violence” for purpose of the career-offender enhancement under federal sentencing guidelines. While the facts of the actual robbery were not considered by the court, it examined what constituted a robbery under the New York statute, concluding that a person can commit robbery without taking any “violent” actions. Some actions, such as possessing a weapon without ever brandishing it during the crime, were especially significant to the court in making this decision.

The Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court decision, United States v. Jones, where the court held that a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act requires an element of “violent force.” The court looking at the New York statute and found that “a robber's possession of a concealed and unmentioned weapon while he commits a robbery can support a first-degree robbery conviction under [New York law] but such possession cannot turn what is otherwise less-than-violent force into violent force.”

As of August 1, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s will release a new set of sentencing guidelines regarding what constitutes a "crime of violence."

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Jones_No_151518cr_2016_BL_233942_2d_Cir_July_21_2.

State Offenses Broader Than Federal Statute Prevent Sentencing Enhancement

State statutes that provide multiple elements and alternatives for a single crime cannot trigger a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act

Mathis v. United States, U.S., No. 15-6092, 6/23/16.

   A defendant convicted for burglary under a state statute that included a broader definition than which is found under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). The federal statute defined burglary as “an unlawful entry into a building or other structure,” while the Iowan statute’s definition of burglary encompassed more, including unlawful entry into any “building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.”

   In response, the court said, “For more than 25 years, our decisions have held that the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense,” Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the 5-3 majority. “The question in this case is whether ACCA makes an exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an exception.”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-6092_1an2.pdf