Ohio: Juvenile Adjudication Cannot be used as Priors in Adult Sentencing

Ohio joins a number of jurisdictions preventing juvenile adjudications to be used as prior convictions during sentencing for adults because it violates due process principals

State v. Hand, 2016 BL 276326, Ohio, No. 2014-1814, 8/25/16.

   The Ohio Supreme Court held that a state statute allowing juvenile convictions to count as priors during sentencing as an adult was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and its line of case law. It found that such statutes violate due process requirements because there is not a right to a jury in juvenile cases. The supreme court followed Apprendi, finding that a right to a jury trial is required because “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   While many federal circuit courts have issued opinions regarding this issue, finding that juvenile crimes can be used to enhance subsequent adult sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act, state supreme courts are divided on the same issue. Ohio joins the minority of jurisdictions that do not enhance sentences based on juvenile adjudication.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/State_v_Hand_2016Ohio5504_Ohio_Aug_25_2016_Court_Opinion.

State Offenses Broader Than Federal Statute Prevent Sentencing Enhancement

State statutes that provide multiple elements and alternatives for a single crime cannot trigger a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act

Mathis v. United States, U.S., No. 15-6092, 6/23/16.

   A defendant convicted for burglary under a state statute that included a broader definition than which is found under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). The federal statute defined burglary as “an unlawful entry into a building or other structure,” while the Iowan statute’s definition of burglary encompassed more, including unlawful entry into any “building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.”

   In response, the court said, “For more than 25 years, our decisions have held that the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense,” Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the 5-3 majority. “The question in this case is whether ACCA makes an exception to that rule when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements. We decline to find such an exception.”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-6092_1an2.pdf

Broad Definition of "Violent Felony" Deemed Unconstitutional

The definition of "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague.

Johnson v. United States, 2015 BL 204915, U.S., No. 13-7120

 

     The Supreme Court looked to the history of "repeated failure[s] to craft a principled standard out of" the definition of "violent felony" in the ACCA. The Court indicated that "nine years' experience trying to derive meaning from the residual clause convinces  us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise."

 

     The wording of the Act was vague and the Court said that "invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process."

 

     In this case, the defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. This conviction was enhanced inder the ACCA. He argued, as many others before, that his particular state offense did not qualify as a "violent felony."

 

     The old standard was a categorical approach, given in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and required sentencing courts to assess the crime "in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion."

 

    Justice Scalia, writing for the court, said that "the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges." Thus, increasing a defendant's sentence under the definition of "violent felony" given in the ACAA denies due process of the law.

 

    The lack of guidance within the clause was integral to the Court's decision. It fails to indicate how to estimate the risk posed by a crime, and how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.

 

    This decision is a major change in the law that affects a large number of defendents who have been sentenced for firearms offenses.