Juror’s Racial Bias Enough to Impeach Verdict and Set New Trial

Revelations of a juror’s racial bias during deliberation opens up the jury verdict to impeachment and allows a court to considers the statement’s in whether to grant a new trial.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).

The Supreme Court held that statements made by a juror during a trial that espouses animus or a bias based on race may violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. In the case, the defendant was convicted of several sex crimes involving minors. After the trial, the defense counsel spoke to jurors about the case and during the conversation, two jurors came forward to alert the defense counsel that one juror made racially disparaging remarks about the defendant to garner support for the conviction verdict. After this discovery, the counsel for the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court, however, denied the motion under the Colorado rule modeled after FRE 606(b), which prohibits the impeachment of a jury verdict based on statements made by a juror.

The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Colorado courts, noting the historical racial bias “implicates unique historical constitutional, and institutional concerns.” Moreover, the court stated “Racial bias is distinct in a pragmatic sense,” while there are safeguards such voir dire or juror observation during the trial, these mechanisms “may be compromised, or….prove insufficient.”

When there is a case where a juror makes a “clear statement that indicates…racial stereotypes or animus [used] to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule gives way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” To show that a racially biased statement impeded a fair trial, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made overtly biased statements that raise doubt on the fairness of the jury deliberations and verdict. The statement must also “show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-606_886b.pdf

Unjustified Shackling of Defendant Does Not Undermine Fair Trial

A defendant has the burden to prove prejudice by showing that the jury saw their shackles when they were unjustifiably shackled during trial.

State v. Brawley, 2016 BL 179698, S.C., No. SC 19441, 6/14/16.

   The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that a defendant must show that the jury saw his shackles during trial to establish prejudice during the trial, even if the shackling was unjustified. The defendant, although charged with multiple violent crimes, was not a flight risk or subject to behavioral issues that posed a danger, not necessitating shackles.

   The defendant argued that the State had the obligation to prove that the jury did not see the shackles because the record was silent on the issue, but the court disagreed. The court noted the practice of the judge in placing a curtain around the defense table so the jury cannot see the prisoner’s legs in addition to having the defendant seated before the jury leaves or enters the courtroom favored the state in that the burden is placed on the defendant.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/State_v_Brawley_No_SC_19441_2016_BL_179698_Conn_June_14_2016_Cour.

Flawed Jury Instructions Regarding a Defendant’s Knowledge Found Harmless

In spite of flawed jury instructions regarding the government’s need to establish a defendant’s knowledge of a crime, overwhelming evidence of a defendant’s guilty knowledge was sufficient to convict him

United States v. McFadden, 2016 BL 160033, 4th Cir., No. 13-4349, 5/19/16

    In McFadden v. United States in 2015, the Supreme Court found the government did not meet its statutory burden of proof regarding criminal intent in convicting a defendant on allegations of dealing drug analogues, such as bath salts.  To be successful, the government must prove the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under federal drug law.

    On remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reinstated six out of nine counts because the evidence that the defendant had guilty knowledge was overwhelming, in spite of jury instructions that did not establish the government’s burden to prove knowledge. Although the jury could infer that the defendant did not know what he was dealing initially, that inference disappears with additional evidence that points to the defendant’s knowledge of the drug when referring to the substance’s potency and duration of the “high.”  While six counts were upheld, three more are remanded back to the district court to be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s ruling. 

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_McFadden_No_134349_2016_BL_160033_4th_Cir_May_19_.

Specific Mens Rea Required For Drug Analogues

It is not rational to presume beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew that just because one drug gives similar effects as another, the two drugs share similar chemical structures.

 

United States v. Makkar, 2015 BL 384626, 10th Cir., No. 14-5147, 11/23/15

    The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the convictions of two men selling controlled substance analogues. The convictions were reversed because the trial court jury had been instructed to infer that because the drug's effects were similar to marijuana, the men knew that it was an illegal drug.

    The court said that "[a]s a matter of common experience and logic, the fact that one drug produces a similar effect to a second drug just doesn't give rise to a rational inference-let alone rationally suggest beyond a reasonable doubt-that the first drug shares a similar chemical structure with the second drug."

    The convictions followed a method of proving mens rea given in McFadden v. United States (U.S. 2015). In that case, and this one, mens rea was proven by showing that the defendants knew the analogue had a similar chemical structure to the illegal drug and produced a similar effect. Those are two separate questions.

    In this case the government never showed that the defendant's knew anything about the chemical structure. Instead they had the jury instructed to infer that the defendants knew the structure was similar based on what they knew the effects to be. This conflated two independent statutory inquiries, and did so by "resorting to a logical fallacy, a hasty generalization or associational error-an unwarranted assumption that because certain things share one characteristic they must share others."

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Makkar_No_145147_2015_BL_384626_10th_Cir_Nov_23_2/1?1451492900