Juror’s Racial Bias Enough to Impeach Verdict and Set New Trial

Revelations of a juror’s racial bias during deliberation opens up the jury verdict to impeachment and allows a court to considers the statement’s in whether to grant a new trial.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).

The Supreme Court held that statements made by a juror during a trial that espouses animus or a bias based on race may violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. In the case, the defendant was convicted of several sex crimes involving minors. After the trial, the defense counsel spoke to jurors about the case and during the conversation, two jurors came forward to alert the defense counsel that one juror made racially disparaging remarks about the defendant to garner support for the conviction verdict. After this discovery, the counsel for the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court, however, denied the motion under the Colorado rule modeled after FRE 606(b), which prohibits the impeachment of a jury verdict based on statements made by a juror.

The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Colorado courts, noting the historical racial bias “implicates unique historical constitutional, and institutional concerns.” Moreover, the court stated “Racial bias is distinct in a pragmatic sense,” while there are safeguards such voir dire or juror observation during the trial, these mechanisms “may be compromised, or….prove insufficient.”

When there is a case where a juror makes a “clear statement that indicates…racial stereotypes or animus [used] to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule gives way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” To show that a racially biased statement impeded a fair trial, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made overtly biased statements that raise doubt on the fairness of the jury deliberations and verdict. The statement must also “show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-606_886b.pdf

After Rule Change, Massachusetts Lawyers May Contact Jurors Post-Trial

After 2015 adoption of ABA Model Rule 3.5(c), attorneys in Massachusetts allowed to conduct post-verdict contact with jurors without court approval or oversight

Commonwealth v. Moore, 2016 BL 190536, Mass., No. SJC-11582, 6/16/16.

   The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturned 36 years of case law that prohibited attorneys from contacting jurors by declining to extend a common law rule after the state adopted a new ethics rule. The case stemmed from an attempt by prosecutors to prevent the defense from interviewing jurors after a high-profile murder trial ended with only a portion of the charges leading to a conviction. The motion was denied and the prosecutors appealed.

    The supreme judicial court in reviewing the motion held that the common law rule against post-verdict communications with jurors was overruled by the 2015 adoption of ABA Model Rule 3.5(c), which lifted the ban on post-verdict contact of jurors. Additionally, the court emphasized that the new rule overturned years of case law completely. “[R]ule 3.5(c) allows attorneys to initiate postverdict contact with jurors without prior court permission or oversight…does not mean, as [the state] apparently fears, that the permitted inquiry is unfettered and unrestricted.” The court noted there exist limitations within the newly adopted rule, such as the prevention of communication that is barred by law, with unwilling jurors, and involving “misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.”

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Commonwealth_v_Moore_No_SJC11582_2016_BL_190536_Mass_June_16_2016.

Proper Exclusion of Evidence of Juror Misconduct

There was no abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to look into alleged misbehavior of a juror because the defendant found the information by violating local rules of post-trial contact.

 

United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2015).

    The rule here is similar to many that prohibit contact with jurors. Middle District of Florida Rule 5.01(d) states that neither an attorney, nor a party may directly or indirectly try to interview a juror after trial unless that person first obtains the court's permission to do so.

    Four months after his conviction, one of the co-defendants violated the no-contact rule by telephoning a juror and having that juror e-mail his attorney about the jury deliberations. That e-mail described the use of the internet to "look[] up things."

   All of the co-defendants cited this as juror misconduct in a motion for a new trial, however, the sanction for violating the no-contact rule is exclusion. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court was correct in denying motion for a new trial, indicating that the misconduct involved was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. The 11th Cir. said "the district court properly struck evidence that was obtained in violation of the local rule restricting communications between a party and juror."