Juror’s Racial Bias Enough to Impeach Verdict and Set New Trial

Revelations of a juror’s racial bias during deliberation opens up the jury verdict to impeachment and allows a court to considers the statement’s in whether to grant a new trial.

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___ (2017).

The Supreme Court held that statements made by a juror during a trial that espouses animus or a bias based on race may violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. In the case, the defendant was convicted of several sex crimes involving minors. After the trial, the defense counsel spoke to jurors about the case and during the conversation, two jurors came forward to alert the defense counsel that one juror made racially disparaging remarks about the defendant to garner support for the conviction verdict. After this discovery, the counsel for the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court, however, denied the motion under the Colorado rule modeled after FRE 606(b), which prohibits the impeachment of a jury verdict based on statements made by a juror.

The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Colorado courts, noting the historical racial bias “implicates unique historical constitutional, and institutional concerns.” Moreover, the court stated “Racial bias is distinct in a pragmatic sense,” while there are safeguards such voir dire or juror observation during the trial, these mechanisms “may be compromised, or….prove insufficient.”

When there is a case where a juror makes a “clear statement that indicates…racial stereotypes or animus [used] to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule gives way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” To show that a racially biased statement impeded a fair trial, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made overtly biased statements that raise doubt on the fairness of the jury deliberations and verdict. The statement must also “show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-606_886b.pdf

After 30 Years, Race-Biased Conviction Overturned

Striking potential jurors based on race is unconstitutional, reaffirming earlier Supreme Court ruling preventing the use of race in jury selection

Foster v. Chatman, 2016 BL 162869, U.S., No. 14-8349, reversed and remanded 5/23/16

 

    The United States Supreme Court ruled that peremptory jury strikes motivated by race are impermissible, reaffirming the court’s 1986 ruling in Batson v. Kentucky.  Annotations along names of black jurors, such as “Definite No” and “No. No Black Church” were “as clear as a Batson violation as a court is ever going to see.”

    

   The Supreme Court focused on two jurors who were stricken. The state offered 11 neutral, non-race based reasons for striking the first juror and eight reasons for the second juror. The Court, however, found the reasons unconvincing and merely suggested pretext. In the opinion, the Court notes the “focus on race in the prosecution’s file plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.” 

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Foster_v_Chatman_No_148349_2016_BL_162869_US_May_23_2016_Court_Op

 

Batson Claim Made Retroactive in 9th Circuit

It is not a new rule that peremptory challenges 'motivated in substantial part' are unconstitutional, it is therefore applicable retroactively.

 

Crittendon v. Chappell, 2015 BL 351088, 9th Cir., 13-17327, 10/26/15

    When reviewing challenges to peremptory juror strikes other circuits have used a 'mixed motives' analysis using other areas of equal protection law. However, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010) that when judge reviews Batson challenges, they should look at whether the proponent of the strike was 'motivated in substantial part' by race and discriminatory intent.

    The court here determined that the rule announced in Cook is not a new one, and can therefore be used to overturn the defendant's conviction from 1989.  Cook only clarified a rule that already existed, and can, under the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) test, be applied retroactively.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Crittenden_v_Chappell_No_1317327_2015_BL_351088_9th_Cir_Oct_26_20