Minority Jurors Are Not Interchangeable Commodities

Attorneys may not justify a peremptory strike by indicating that they intend to replace the person with another juror of the same race, because that is not race- neutral.

 

Ray-Simmons v. State, 2016 BL 49211, Md., No. 28, 2/22/16

     A prosecutor attempted to justify a peremptory strike of a black man by saying that she planned to replace him with "another black male" from the other prospective jurors.  The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that this violated Batson because that rationalization was neither race- nor gender-neutral.

     The court indicated that the prosecutor's suggestion that minority jurors are interchangeable saved the defense from having to make out the prima facie case of discrimination. The court said that "[a] desire to replace a juror with another unspecified member of the panel does not explain in any way, race-neutral or otherwise, the prosecutor's reasons to strike that particular juror."

     Because the original case happened four years ago, and the circumstances surrounding the challenge could not be reconstructed easily, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/RaySimmons_v_State_No_28_2016_BL_49211_Md_Feb_22_2016_Court_Opini

Batson Claim Made Retroactive in 9th Circuit

It is not a new rule that peremptory challenges 'motivated in substantial part' are unconstitutional, it is therefore applicable retroactively.

 

Crittendon v. Chappell, 2015 BL 351088, 9th Cir., 13-17327, 10/26/15

    When reviewing challenges to peremptory juror strikes other circuits have used a 'mixed motives' analysis using other areas of equal protection law. However, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010) that when judge reviews Batson challenges, they should look at whether the proponent of the strike was 'motivated in substantial part' by race and discriminatory intent.

    The court here determined that the rule announced in Cook is not a new one, and can therefore be used to overturn the defendant's conviction from 1989.  Cook only clarified a rule that already existed, and can, under the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) test, be applied retroactively.

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Crittenden_v_Chappell_No_1317327_2015_BL_351088_9th_Cir_Oct_26_20

Making Peremptory Jury Strikes Without Defense Counsel Input after Objections Ruled Harmess Error.

 

Prosecutor giving nondiscriminatory reasons for peremptory jury strikes without defense counsel present to discuss objections is a harmless error.

 

Davis v. Ayala, 2015 BL 193518, U.S., No. 1301428

 

 

       A hispanic man convicted of triple homicide by a jury with no black or hispanic people on it is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, in spite of the fact that his attorney was not present to contest the prosecution's claimed nondiscriminatory reasons for striking them.

 

      Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), holds that the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Under this precedent, the defense attorney did object to the peremptory strikes of all of the black and hispanic jurors, however, defense counsel was not allowed to participate in the discussions between the judge and the prosecutor that resolved the objections.

 

     The court said "[t]here is no basis for finding that Ayala suffered actual prejudice, and the decision of the California Supreme Court," which affirmed his conviction, was "an entirely reasonable application of controlling precedent."

 

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Davis_v_Ayala_No_131428_2015_BL_193518_US_June_18_2015_Court_Opin