Jury Instruction Describing “Serious Bodily Injury” Violated Defendant’s Constitutional Rights

Jury instructions that stated that defined strangulation unto consciousness as a "serious bodily injury" violated the defendant's constitutional rights because he was entitled to the jury making a determination of every element of the crime.

State v. Walker, 2017 UT App 2.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that a jury instruction incorporating language that defined strangulation unto consciousness as a “serious bodily injury” violated the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, requiring the verdict to be vacated and the case to be remanded for a new trial. The defendant was initially charged with aggravated assault for strangling his wife during a domestic dispute. During the trial, the jury was instructed of the varying levels of assault. Additionally, the court included an instruction that was not based on any statutory language, but two Utah Supreme Court cases, that stated “strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury.” The defendant objected to the instruction because it violated his “right to have the jury make a determination of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the offense.” The Court of Appeals rejected the state’s argument that the instruction incorporated a standard by the Supreme Court, finding that the definition of strangulation as a serious bodily injury was never meant to fit into the legislature’s definition of “serious bodily injury.” By including this instruction, the trial court supplanted the jury’s role as fact-finder and establishing the elements of the charged crime. The combination of the instruction, the evidence admitted during trial, and the closing argument by the prosecutor further highlighted the possible influence the instruction had on the jury in reaching their conclusion. 

https://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/State%20v.%20Walker20170106.pdf

Conviction for Threatening Facebook Comments Reinstated

After a conviction for threatening statements was overturned by the Supreme Court, the circuit court ruled that the failure to instruct the jury on the proper mental state element of the crime was merely a harmless error

 United States v. Elonis, 3d Cir., No. 12-3798, 10/28/16.

The Third Circuit reinstated the conviction of a man who posted threatening messages on Facebook, finding that the lack of instruction regarding intent in the jury instructions was a harmless error. A year before, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction due to the objective standard used to convict the defendant, which was the improper standard. The Court, in their reading of the statute, found that a subjective intent on part of the defendant must be established to meet the mental state element of the crime. On reversal, the Third Circuit found that the incorrect jury instructions regarding the defendant’s intent were ultimately a harmless error, not requiring reversal. The court pointed to the amount of evidence showing that the defendant knew his statements were directly terrifying specific individuals. The opinion stated, “The record contains overwhelming evidence demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew the threatening nature of his communications, and therefore would have been convicted absent the error.”

The Third Circuit, however, did not address whether a “recklessness” standard should be used to convict the defendant. The Supreme Court, in its decision, did not fully address the issue, although it was suggested in a concurring opinion. Rather than making a finding on the standard, the Third Circuit relied on its harmless error reasoning.

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Elonis_No_123798_2016_BL_359855_3d_Cir_Oct_28_201?1478712044

Maine Joins Other Jurisdictions Allowing Jury Instructions for Eyewitness Identification

After considering the growing body of scientific research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification, the ban against trial judges giving jury instructions on this topic was lifted

State v. Mahmoud, 2016 BL 264503, Me., No. And-15-147, 8/16/16.

The Maine Supreme Court joined a multitude of other jurisdictions in allowing trial judges to give jury instructions regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification. This overturns a ban to such instructions that has been in place since 1989. The court held, “In light of the voluminous body of scientific research that has emerged regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification, and the subsequent evolving trend among both state and federal courts to instruct juries on this matter, we conclude that it is permissible, where relevant, to instruct jurors on the reliability of eyewitness identification.”

The court did add one caveat, that these instructions would not need to be used in every case. One example the court provided was that such instructions are unnecessary when the identified person was already known to the witness.

Similar instructions are allowed in Utah under the Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition. 

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/State_v_Mahmoud_No_Docket_And15147_2016_BL_264503_Me_Aug_16_2016_.

Flawed Jury Instructions Regarding a Defendant’s Knowledge Found Harmless

In spite of flawed jury instructions regarding the government’s need to establish a defendant’s knowledge of a crime, overwhelming evidence of a defendant’s guilty knowledge was sufficient to convict him

United States v. McFadden, 2016 BL 160033, 4th Cir., No. 13-4349, 5/19/16

    In McFadden v. United States in 2015, the Supreme Court found the government did not meet its statutory burden of proof regarding criminal intent in convicting a defendant on allegations of dealing drug analogues, such as bath salts.  To be successful, the government must prove the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under federal drug law.

    On remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reinstated six out of nine counts because the evidence that the defendant had guilty knowledge was overwhelming, in spite of jury instructions that did not establish the government’s burden to prove knowledge. Although the jury could infer that the defendant did not know what he was dealing initially, that inference disappears with additional evidence that points to the defendant’s knowledge of the drug when referring to the substance’s potency and duration of the “high.”  While six counts were upheld, three more are remanded back to the district court to be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s ruling. 

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_McFadden_No_134349_2016_BL_160033_4th_Cir_May_19_.