Judge Under Investigation Should Have Recused Himself From Trial

A trial judge that was under a bribery investigation by the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting a defendant in his court should have recused himself from the trial

Rippo v. Baker, U.S., No. 16-6316, 3/6/17.

The United States Supreme Court held that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a judge recuse himself while under criminal investigation by the same prosecuting office as a defendant in his court. Before trial, the defendant moved to have the judge recuse himself because of the possibility the judge would not be impartial in adjudicating the criminal proceedings. The motion was denied and the defendant sentenced to death. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, finding that the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “has no actual bias.” In their opinion, the court found that “Recusal is required when….the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-6316_32h6.pdf

Jury Instruction Describing “Serious Bodily Injury” Violated Defendant’s Constitutional Rights

Jury instructions that stated that defined strangulation unto consciousness as a "serious bodily injury" violated the defendant's constitutional rights because he was entitled to the jury making a determination of every element of the crime.

State v. Walker, 2017 UT App 2.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that a jury instruction incorporating language that defined strangulation unto consciousness as a “serious bodily injury” violated the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, requiring the verdict to be vacated and the case to be remanded for a new trial. The defendant was initially charged with aggravated assault for strangling his wife during a domestic dispute. During the trial, the jury was instructed of the varying levels of assault. Additionally, the court included an instruction that was not based on any statutory language, but two Utah Supreme Court cases, that stated “strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury.” The defendant objected to the instruction because it violated his “right to have the jury make a determination of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the offense.” The Court of Appeals rejected the state’s argument that the instruction incorporated a standard by the Supreme Court, finding that the definition of strangulation as a serious bodily injury was never meant to fit into the legislature’s definition of “serious bodily injury.” By including this instruction, the trial court supplanted the jury’s role as fact-finder and establishing the elements of the charged crime. The combination of the instruction, the evidence admitted during trial, and the closing argument by the prosecutor further highlighted the possible influence the instruction had on the jury in reaching their conclusion. 

https://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/State%20v.%20Walker20170106.pdf

Wisconsin: Risk-Prediction Software (With Conditions) Does Not Violate Due Process in Sentencing

Risk-prediction programs that utilize an algorithm to assess the possibility of recidivism do not violate due process as long as they are used with other methods to determine sentencing 

State v. Loomis, 2016 BL 224113, Wis., No. 2015AP157-CR, 7/8/16.

   The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that risk-assessment software did not violate a defendant’s due process rights during sentencing. While the court recognized some of the defendant’s claims as being legitimate, such as the potential that these programs have for disproportionately classifying minorities as risky, the court still was unwilling to scrap the existing program entirely. Instead, the court approved the continued use of the software, but only as long as it was used in conjunction with other factors in determining sentencing. Additionally, the court ordered that an advisement listing the limitations of the software be circulated to judges performing sentencing hearings.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/State_v_Loomis_No_2015AP157CR_2016_BL_224113_Wis_July_13_2016_Cou.