Use of the “Question First, Warn Later” Tactic Not a Curative Measure in Police Interrogation

Police that question a suspect first, get a statement, recite the Miranda warnings, and then solicit the statement again can no longer rely on the warning as a curative measure under Missouri v. Seibert

Reyes v. Lewis, 2016 BL 266420, 9th Cir., No. 12-56650, 8/17/16.

   The Ninth Circuit found that the police tactic of questioning a suspect, receiving a statement, and then giving their Miranda warnings would not make a second statement admissible in court. Police must take special “curative measures” to ensure that the suspect understands their rights, even if a statement is obtained from the suspect before their Miranda warnings. The purposeful tactic of questioning first and then providing the warning afterwards cannot be used without further measures to ensure that a reasonable person would understand the effect of the Miranda warnings and waiver.

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Reyes_v_Lewis_No_1256650_2016_BL_266420_9th_Cir_Aug_17_2016_Court?1472579705

Suppression Ruling During Pretrial Has Preclusive Effect During Federal Civil Rights Suit

A motion to suppress ruling at pretrial precludes a later federal civil rights claim regarding a seizure because the Fourth Amendment violation was already resolved during the criminal proceeding

Nance v. Humane Soc'y of Pulaski Cty., 2016 BL 252098, 8th Cir., No. 15-3512, 8/4/16.

   The Eighth Circuit ruled that a couple cannot not sue in federal court under 43 U.S.C. § 1983 because a state’s court ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress evidence precluded their claim. During their criminal trial, the couple motioned to suppress evidence that was collected in an animal cruelty investigation. The trial court had a hearing and admitted the evidence, resolving the possibility of any Fourth Amendment claim that could be raised later. In their opinion, the circuit court rebutted any claim that the couple did not have an opportunity to fully litigate the validity of the seizure on an alternative argument. It held that any alternative argument should have been presented during the pretrial proceedings, and the failure to do so, now bars their civil rights claim on this issue.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Nance_v_Humane_Socy_of_Pulaski_Cty_No_153512_2016_BL_252098_8th_C.

Polygraph Admitted to Explain Police Questioning

When the defendant testified that his confession was coerced, it opened the door to cross-examinations about the his polygraph test.

 

United States v. Tenorio, 2015 BL 428927, 10th Cir., No. 15-2037, 12/29/15

    The court ruled that the government had a strong interest in giving the jury a more complete picture of what the defendant indicated was an aggressive interrogation, so the judge admitted the fact that the police had obtained the confession after a polygraph test had been administered.

    The defendant had previously testified that he was bullied into writing a confession and did not understand why the agents kept accusing him of lying and telling only "half the story." The judge limited the admission of the polygraph to only explain the officer's actions and directed the jurors to not speculate about the results of the polygraph.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/United_States_v_Tenorio_No_152037_2015_BL_428927_10th_Cir_Dec_29_?1452526628

Wittnesses' Opinion That Speaks To All Elements of Crime Disallowed

The opinion of a detective testifying as an expert should have been inadmissible because it spoke to all elements of the crime.

 

Williams v. State, 2015 BL 353500, Ind., No. 48S05-1507-CR-424, 10/26/15

    The detective was testifying as an expert and expressed that he had "zero doubt" that the exchange between the defendant and the informant was a drug transaction. The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that his testimony should have been declared inadmissible as an opinion on the ultimate issue of guilt.

    The rules of evidence bar witnesses from giving their opinion regarding guilt or innocence, and the court ruled that the detective's testimony violated that rule. The court indicated that this was different from testimony regarding intoxication or identity, which can be allowed, because this testimony discussed all of the elements of the crime, including mens rea.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Williams_v_State_No_48S051507CR424_2015_BL_353500_Ind_Oct_26_2015?1449089156

Confrontation Rights Violated By A Letter From Beyond The Grave

The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by showing the jury a letter from the victim written two weeks before her death predicting that her husband would kill her.

 

Jensen v. Clements, 2015 BL 289651, 7th Cir., No. 14-1380, 9/8/15

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit said that it was not a harmless error because "[n]o other piece of evidence had the emotional and dramatic impact as did this 'letter from the grave."

    The Wisconsin Supreme Court had originally ruled that the letter was admissible (overturning the trial court's decision not to allow it), holding that it was admitted under the doctrine of "forfeiture by wrongdoing." That doctrine allows testimonial evidence to be allowed from an absent witness if the state can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused caused the witness's absence.

    The U.S. Supreme Court, while this case was on appeal, clarified the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine in the case of Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). They indicated that the "forfeiture by wrongdoing exception can only be invoked if there is proof that the defendant caused the declarant's unavailability with the intent of silencing the witness.

    The Wisconsin Supreme Court had ruled that because the poisoning - if any - was to kill the wife, not keep her from testifying, the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception did not apply. It also, however, held that the confrontation clause violation was harmless.

    The federal district court found, on habeas review, that the state court's application of the harmless-error doctrine was unreasonable. This subjected it to review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).
   
    The Seventh Circuit agreed, and voided the conviction, and invoked the recent Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Ayala, 2015 BL 193928 (U.S. June 18, 2015). This held that a state court's rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error that occurred was harmless qualifies as a reviewable adjudication on the merits for AEDPA reasons.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Jensen_v_Clements_No_141380_2015_BL_289651_7th_Cir_Sept_08_2015_C

Other Evidence Used to Determine Extent of Bruton Error

A state court must look beyond the four corners of a nontestifying co-defendant's redacted confession when evaluating the merits of a confrontation clause claim.

 

Washington v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 2015 BL 282414, 3d Cir., No. 12-2883, 9/1/15

    The Bruton rule prohibits prosecutors from presenting a nontestifying co-defendant's confession to the jury when that confession implicates the defendant. These confessions are sometimes allowed, if references to the defendant are eliminated. (Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). However, in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), the court indicated that merely replacing the references to the defendant with the word "deleted" or a blank space set off by commas was not enough to keep a confession from facially incriminating the defendant, and rendering limiting jury instructions moot.

    In this case the prosecution replaced references to the defendant with phrases such as "someone I know," "the other guy," "the driver," the guy who went into the store," and "the shooter." The Third Circuit held that this did not cure the confrontation problem because an accomplice who had already testified had identified the defendant as the driver, making it simple for the jury to connect the dots in the redacted confession.

    The state court in this case, ruled the Third Circuit, erroneously used an overly strict interpretation of the Bruton/Richardson/Gray cases and looked only within the four corners of the confession. As a result of the error, the state court found no confrontation problem because there was no direct implication of the defendant.

    The Third Circuit ruled that this interpretation violated the clearly established rules set by the U.S. Supreme Court "and would permit the admission of many facially incriminating confessions."

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Washington_v_Secy_Pa_Dept_of_Corr_No_122883_2015_BL_282414_3d_Cir