Dismissal Due To Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Not Barred by FTCA

The Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) does not prevent cases dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to preclude later claims with similar subject matter that are not subject to the Act's judgment bar

 Simmons v. Himmelreich, U.S., 15-109, decided 6/6/16

   The FTCA allows private individuals to bring suits against the government for most tort claims committed by those working on behalf of the United States. Under certain exceptions in the statute, someclaims cannot be litigated against employees who rely on their statutory duty for individual decision making. A prisoner's claim was dismissed due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction under this exception. He then quickly filed a separate Bivens claim, arguing his constitutional rights were violated, raising the issue of whether his Bivens claim is precluded by the earlier dismissal.

   In this holding, the court provided a bright-line rule for these claims: FTCA's judgment bar provision does not apply to claims dismissed for falling within the act's "exceptions" section. The court in its opinion states, "the plain text of the 'Exceptions' section dictates that the judgment bar doesn't apply to a case such as this one--based on performance of a discretionary duty." The straight forward opinion will allow prisoners in similarly situated situations to raise a second claim that may be barred under FTCA.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-109_p860.pdf

Supreme Court Remands PLRA Case

The Supreme Court, in remanding a Prison Litigation Reform Act case to the circuit court, hints that administrative remedies provided by the state were so confusing that they effectively became “unavailable.”

Ross v. Blake, U.S., No. 15-339, 6/6/16.

After a complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), an inmate’s case will be remanded back to the circuit court after the Supreme Court received new documents detailing the state’s confusing administrative remedies provided to prisoners, which the Supreme Court suggested that the remedies were so confusing that they negate any administrative relief.

Initially, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if special circumstance could be created under the PLRA for an inmate who thought he exhausted every remedy before filing a civil suit, but did not. After receiving new documents detailing the administrative procedures provided by the state for inmates, the case was remanded back to the circuit court to review the same question in light of the new documents being provided by the parties.

Additionally, the Supreme Court asked the circuit court to determine whether “Maryland officials thwarted the effective invocation of the administration process through threats, game-playing, or misrepresentations, either on a system-wide basis or in the individual case[.]”

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-339_1b7d.pdf

Jurisdictional Elements in Aggravated Felonies for Immigrants Are Immaterial for Conviction

A state offense is considered an aggravated felony when it meets the elements of the matching federal crime, even when it lacks a similar jurisdictional element found in the federal statute

Torres v. Lynch, 2016 BL 159420, U.S., No. 14-1096, 5/19/16.

   Aggravated felonies can now include state offenses that match elements of a federal crime listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) without the jurisdictional elements. These offenses, without the interstate or foreign commerce element used to establish federal jurisdiction, will make it easier to deport or deny discretionary relief to immigrants convicted of such felonies.

   The ruling will uphold the position that several circuit courts have taken, such as the Second and Ninth Circuits were the bulk of immigration cases take place. This ruling, however, will prevent “long-time legal permanent residents with convictions for minor state offenses [from] appealing to the sound discretion of the Attorney General to obtain relief from removal.” As the dissenting opinion notes, they would have liked to preserve “more possibilities for immigration judges to consider individual equities and circumstances in determining the appropriateness of deportation.”

   Judges in analyzing cases involving aggravated felonies will now have less discretion in granting relief, but immigration judges deciding whether to grant relief from removal can still consider the seriousness of any offense, including aggravated felonies.  Ultimately, this decision prevents statutory loopholes that may prevent removal of some immigrants in the country after committing state felonies that lacked a jurisdictional element tying it to the INA.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Luna_Torres_v_Lynch_No_141096_US_May_19_2016_Court_Opinion?1465323537

Government Must Notify Bail Bond of Material Modification of Bond Conditions

A bail bond company is not liable for any material modifications of the bond’s conditions without actual notice by the court first

United States v. Mohammed-Ali, 2016 BL 156093, 6th Cir., No. 15-6003, 5/17/16.

   Constructive notice of a change in a bond’s conditions is not sufficient for a bail bond agency to be liable.  Actual notice of a change in conditions by a company is both fair and practical, the court noted, further stating that it was “unrealistic to expect a bail bond company to constantly sift through every motion in all its cases to check whether a bond’s conditions have been altered.” Moreover, the burden of notice is better placed on some other party, including the court, defendant, or prosecutor. In enforcing a bond’s liability, the court must send actual notice by mail, a benefit that should be extended to bail bond companies when “a motion that leads to the condition…creates the bail bond’s liability in the first place.”

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_MohammedAli_No_156003_2016_BL_156093_6th_Cir_May_

Salaried Worker Who Embezzled Money Must Also Repay For Time Not Worked

Although on salary, a worker that embezzled money from her company must also repay for time that would have been spent working in addition to money that was stolen

United States v. Tadios, 2016 BL 157858, 9th Cir., No. 14-30231, 5/18/16.

    The Ninth Circuit now joins the Second Circuit view that salaried employees should  be required to repay their employer for time not spent working when employed in addition to amount owed after embezzling an employer’s funds. The court took into consideration that “by failing to claim or deduct annual leave…[the defendant] harmed clinic twice over: first, by getting the clinic to pay for travel expenses it had no obligation to cover, and again by getting the clinic to pay her salary for time she was supposed to be working but was not.”

   The circuit court affirmed the district court’s calculation of multiplying employee’s estimated hourly rate by the number of hours she should have taken as annual leave. In applying this to salaried workers, defendants can no longer claim that a place of employment does not suffer compensable loss because she was a salaried worker entitled to full pay regardless of travel or vacation time.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/United_States_v_Tadios_No_1430231_2016_BL_157858_9th_Cir_May_18_2